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THESIS

**DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN
FRANCE AND GERMANY: IMPLICATIONS
FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY**

by

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December, 1996

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IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS


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
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
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This thesis explores the changing demographic picture in France and Germany and how it may affect U.S. national security in the near future. While demographics are only one set of the many forces driving changes in the way the United States and Western Europe interact and cooperate, they have the potential to fundamentally change the way Western Europe shapes and implements its security policies around the world. This thesis examines how demographic trends in Western Europe, particularly France and Germany, will affect those countries' abilities to fund and man viable military forces. The analysis includes topics such as immigration, terrorism, the importation of foreign conflicts, and increased nationalistic xenophobia. Finally it examines the implications these demographic changes will have on U.S. national security, in particular the willingness of France and Germany to act as U.S. allies and their ability to invest in defense spending. It concludes that while they are radically changing their force posture, France and Germany will continue to rely on the U.S. military for European security. Also, if Western Europe's social welfare programs are not significantly reformed, demographic forces will necessitate further decreases in defense spending.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	THE AGING POPULATION OF FRANCE AND GERMANY	7
A.	MILITARY IMPACTS	9
B.	ECONOMIC IMPACTS	13
1.	Loss of International Competitiveness	15
2.	Implications for European Integration	20
C.	IMMIGRATION TO WESTERN EUROPE	23
1.	Racism/Nationalism vs. Assimilation	26
a.	Differences in Assimilating New Cultures	27
b.	Rise in Xenophobic Political Movements	29
2.	Terrorism	33
a.	Importation of Foreign Conflicts	35
D.	POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON FUTURE POLITICAL/SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS	37
1.	Changing Political Priorities	38
2.	Changing Power Bases	39
3.	Limited Ability of a Country to Operate Abroad	40
4.	Declining Population Countries with Expanding Populations on Their Borders	43
5.	Effects of New Technologies	46
6.	Military Manpower	48

III.	IMPACT OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY . . .	51
A.	DEFENSE SPENDING IN FRANCE AND GERMANY	54
B.	PROBABLE FORCE POSTURE EVALUATION	56
C.	FRANCE AND GERMANY AS U.S. ALLIES	65
D.	WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN MILITARY OPERATIONS . . .	68
E.	IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S./WESTERN EUROPE MILITARY BURDEN SHARING	70
F.	ABILITY TO INVEST IN JOINT INFRASTRUCTURE	71
G.	CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE IMPACT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY . . .	78
IV.	CONCLUSION	81
A.	OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS	82
B.	THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE	84
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	87
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	93

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

France and Germany at this time are the two strongest countries on the European continent, both economically and militarily. Throughout the Cold War, France and the Federal Republic of Germany were close partners of the United States. This was demonstrated most notably through their participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, with the end of the Cold War, the global security situation has changed dramatically. There is no longer the direct threat to European security there was before the Soviet Union collapsed. Western Europe, particularly France and Germany, now sees itself as having a larger role in global affairs. It is important to ask, what type of a role will it be able to undertake and how effective will it be? The result will have an impact on the military abilities of the U.S. and NATO to act in global conflicts.

This thesis examines Western European demographic trends, especially in France and Germany, and the possible effects they will have on future United States national security. Demographics make up only one set of factors in national power and strategy. This thesis also explores other components, related to and affected by demography, that affect how a nation acts: namely population composition and changes, social cohesion, governmental support systems and national and popular preferences. Demography, along with these elements, is driving some basic problems that Western Europeans are presently starting to experience and which will likely only grow worse in the future.

The problems manifested at this time by the demographic trends are:

- * Growing social welfare costs. This is due mainly to the increase in the percentage of retired population and the inability of the European governments to bring about reforms in their social welfare programs.

- * Loss of international economic competitiveness. There is very strong opposition to any wage or social benefit cuts by the public in an attempt to make labor costs competitive with the international economic community.

- * A decrease in military-aged men, most notably in Germany.

- * Immigration problems. The populations in less developed nations such as Algeria and Turkey are rapidly increasing, leading to an influx of immigrants into Western Europe. Nationalism and racism against these immigrants has grown, partly because of problems in assimilating recent Muslim immigrants.

- * An increase in terrorism imported by the immigrants from their home countries. Civil conflicts in Africa and the Middle East have spread into Europe.

The demographic changes will affect European security and impact on U.S. security in the following ways:

- * Western Europeans will remain reliant on the U.S. for their security for the foreseeable future. Western European countries will not be able to increase defense spending in the future without a major social welfare program reform. At this time there does not seem to be the political will to simultaneously decrease social spending while

increasing defense spending.

* By restructuring their forces France and Germany will increase the number of troops they are able to deploy out of area, although this number will only be approximately 50,000 each. The number of combat troops will be much smaller, as this total also includes Navy, Air Force and Army personnel as well as all the required support forces.

* France and Germany are behind the U.S. in funding military equipment, and their budgets are decreasing. With this decrease in defense spending and the long lead times involved in building up a military infrastructure, they will continue to remain reliant on the use of U.S. military assets such as logistical support and space-based communications and intelligence.

* Western Europe will continue to pressure NATO to increase assets and resources to deal with the Mediterranean region.

* There is the possibility that the new global orientation of NATO will not be a viable concept, and that it will become in effect a U.S. force with token European representation. The high cost of out-of-area deployments, increased domestic pressures, and the possibility of minority activism will affect France's and Germany's willingness to take part in military operations outside of Europe.

* Because of the lack of an overt threat against Western Europe and domestic pressures brought about by economic problems, European global objectives may increasingly diverge from those of the U.S. This has the potential to leave the U.S. to act unilaterally or with other regional allies in non-European conflicts.

I. INTRODUCTION

Among the considerations for U.S. security in the future will be the United States's ability to work with and rely on its Western European allies. Because of decreases in the U.S. defense budget, the likelihood of increases in the number of potential antagonists, and the spread of weapons to lesser-developed countries and their associated growth in military strength, U.S. military power in the future will be increasingly tied to its allies' capabilities.

One question for American national security is: To what extent will France and Germany be able to serve as reliable allies? Cooperative security and reliance on allies to share in the cost of international military operations have become important elements of U.S. security strategy. In this context the United States is asking European countries to contribute more toward their own defense and regional peacekeeping operations.

This paper discusses the changes that are taking place in the French and German armed forces and the ability and willingness of those nations to take part in global operations. The big question Western European countries will have to ask themselves in the future is "whether stability in other regions, or more specifically a respect for the elementary principle of non-aggression, is worth fighting for,"¹ and -- perhaps more importantly -- is it worth paying for?

Declining birthrates has been a recent phenomenon in Western

¹Laurence Freedman, "The Future of Conflict," Jane's Intelligence Review, Year Book, (Coulsdan, Surrey, U.K.: Jane's Information Group, 1994), 5.

European countries. This development -- in combination with other factors such as improved health care and longer life spans -- has contributed to an overall aging of the populations. Western Europe is also experiencing two divergent trends: a drop in employment and a simultaneous increase in immigration and foreign refugees. Barring a national emergency, a national government's budget is generally constrained by the interplay of social, political and economic forces; the growing proportion of the aging population and resulting social welfare costs. Demographics also sets a baseline in the number of personnel available for military service.

Demographics make up only one set of factors affecting the Western European security situation. Other components, related to and affected by demographics, that influence national power and strategy must be taken into account and are also explored in this thesis. These include population composition and changes, social cohesion, governmental social support systems, national and popular preferences, and the nature and severity of outside threats.

The recent economic slowdown and loss of jobs coupled with the increasing costs of social programs -- pensions, health care benefits and welfare payments -- have in the short run caused large deficits in national budgets. Most governments have found it easier to reduce military budgets instead of the budgets of highly entrenched social programs. In the long run, the aging population will only exacerbate the problems faced now. Social spending will go up because of the sheer numbers of retirees, while the money available to the government will go down because there will be fewer taxpayers available to shoulder the burden.

Western European social programs are structured in a pay-as-you-go scheme. Because of the substantial increase in the retired population, these programs will eventually demand the lion's share of Western European governmental budgets, leaving little left over for defense. There is growing popular discord in France and Germany against any change in the social welfare programs. This not only has implications of the ability of those governments to pay for necessary improvements to the military infrastructure, but also may slow or even reverse future European integration measures. Thus far, all attempts France and Germany have taken to reduce or reform government social programs have been met with strong resistance. As a result, it is increasingly unpopular to make the cuts needed to take the next step in European integration -- establishment of the Monetary Union -- and in the end the political will to make these cuts may be lacking.

Because of decreased fertility rates most Western European countries have populations that are declining, or at best, growing very slowly. Other, less-developed countries currently have booming populations. Northern Africa, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa all have very high, positive population growth rates that are projected to continue well into the 21st century. Population pressures, coupled with an increase in civil conflicts throughout the Third World and a significant decrease in economic growth, have led to increases in immigrants and refugees attempting to enter Western Europe. Future refugee movements may become so large as to cause widespread disruptions in Western European countries. The potential also exists for civil conflicts in Africa and the Mideast to spread with the immigrants into France and Germany.

At a time when Western Europe is experiencing its own economic recession, the increase in immigration has had the effect of escalating nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes. The xenophobic activities of right-wing groups threaten to ignite an immigrant backlash within the host countries themselves. France and Germany have different ideas and criteria -- compared with each other as well as with the United States -- of what constitutes citizenship. The troubles they have had in assimilating different cultures into their societies have added to the confusion and anger shown by immigrant minorities.

The effects of these demographic changes on the future political and security environments will be profound and lasting, and in turn will affect the United States's future security policy. These include changing political priorities and power bases, thus possibly limiting the ability of France and Germany to operate effectively abroad. France and Germany will also be forced in the future to interact with countries that have large and expanding populations. The effects of new technology are discussed in this thesis in relation to whether technology itself can overcome the effects of decreased population growth.

If Western European countries cannot overcome the problems that will be brought about by their changing demographics, the U.S. will also be faced with difficult choices. If France and Germany cannot build and maintain military forces that will be able to act effectively as U.S. allies in joint operations, the United States will be forced to act unilaterally in certain military scenarios. While France and Germany are restructuring their militaries in order to more

effectively deploy a larger number of troops, the total number of actual combatants available to be deployed may not be enough to make up for the recent decreases in U.S. troop strength. Another question remains as to whether France and Germany will choose to militarily support the U.S. in out-of-region operations if they are increasingly oriented toward Europe. This issue may come about because of domestic and intra-European problems. These questions become more important if major conflicts are envisioned. In a future Major Regional Contingency (MRC), the United States will be even more reliant on support from its allies than during the Iraq War.² Without this support, the United States will have to decide if its national interests in that region are important enough to act unilaterally or if it has the military capabilities to intervene at all.

²The 1996 White House National Security Strategy states "The Administration's defense strategy, which requires U.S. forces to be able to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression in concert with regional allies in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts, has proved realistic." The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, February 1996), 4.

II. THE AGING POPULATION OF FRANCE AND GERMANY

There is an increasing shift in the makeup of Western European populations. Fertility rates of native peoples have gone down while life expectancy has increased. The populations of France and Germany, as well as most other Western European countries, are growing older, with a smaller percentage of the population composed of military and working-age men and women.

While France is expected to increase in population as a whole over the next 30 years, the largest percentage of increase will be from those over 65 years of age. Germany, on the other hand, is projected to lose population overall, with the only increase in numbers being in people over 65.³ (See Table 1.)

The life expectancy of people in Western Europe has increased steadily since keeping statistics on populations was started. In 1990, the life expectancy was 73 years for males and 79 for females. In the future, life expectancy for Europeans is expected to continue to increase slowly.

The fertility rates (number of live births per woman) of France and Germany have been dropping steadily since about 1770 and 1850 respectively, with only a short rise after the Second World War in the late 1940's and the 1950's. By 1989, France had a total fertility

³William H. McNeill, Population and Politics since 1750 (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 1990), 62. One difference between French statistics and German is that the French count children from parents of foreign descent as French, while Germany does not. This makes it more difficult to distinguish between native French citizens and citizens of foreign heritage.

rate of 1.8 and Germany's was 1.5. A total fertility rate of 2.1 is necessary for population replacement.⁴

Table 1 Population by age, 1985-2025

	Population in Thousands			Percentage Change		
				1985 -	2000 -	1985 -
	1985	2000	2025	2000	2025	2025
France						
Total	55171	58770	61805	6.5	5.2	12.0
0-14	11763	11325	11320	-3.7	0.0	-3.8
15-65	36499	38651	38437	5.9	-0.6	5.3
65+	6909	8794	12048	27.3	37.0	74.4
20-29	8549	7857	7455	-8.1	-5.1	-12.8
Germany (FRG)						
Total	61013	58951	52821	-3.4	-10.4	-13.4
0-14	9263	8459	8314	-8.7	-1.7	-10.2
15-65	42906	40474	32220	-5.7	-20.4	-24.9
65+	8844	10018	12287	13.3	22.6	38.9
20-29	9890	6334	5500	-36.0	-13.2	-44.4

Source: K C Zachariah and My T Vu World Population Projections, 1987-88 Edition. (Published for the World Bank by John Hopkins University Press, 1988)

At this time, there is no indication that the fertility rates of France or Germany will increase dramatically in the future. One description of how the situation of reduced fertility is changing among the demography of whole countries is given by McNeill (1990).

⁴John Saunders, "Population Change in Europe: Past experience and Future Prospects," in Freedman and Saunders, eds., Population Change and European Security (London: Brassey's, 1991), 21.

Differential birthrates among rich and poor have been apparent ever since modern statistics started to be collected; and in a sense, all that is happening in the last decades of the twentieth century is that this pattern has begun to reach across ethnic and cultural boundaries. As a whole nation becomes rich and urbanized, reproduction dwindles.⁵

Changes in lifestyles visible in Western European countries are also having an impact. People are generally waiting longer to marry and have children. "Below replacement fertility is an adjustment to new social and economic circumstances in which increasing levels of consumption of goods and services and altered individual aspirations have become incompatible with high fertility rates and prolonged population growth."⁶ Children are simply not needed, or wanted, in large numbers, as they are in an agricultural society. It is not likely that Western Europe will revert back to a society that favors high fertility rates - at least in currently foreseeable circumstances.

A. MILITARY IMPACTS

Declining fertility rates will make it increasingly difficult for France and Germany to maintain their military forces at current levels. In the future there will be a smaller pool of manpower from which to draw servicemen. West Germany's 18 to 22 year old male cohort is predicted to drop by one million men to 1.6 million by the

⁵McNeill, 60.

⁶Saunders, 32.

year 2010.⁷ Although, by 2010, both French and German 18 to 22 year old populations are predicted to stabilize, they will be at much lower levels than in the past. Collectively, the 16 nations of NATO will register a 12.4 percent decrease in the number of draft age males (18-22) by the year 2000.⁸

As a reaction to the decrease in manpower, the German Army is already taking in personnel who would have been rejected as unfit only a year ago. "Defense officials say they have no choice but to lower physical standards and demands: This generation is less numerous than its predecessors, and more young men than ever -- 160,659 last year (1995) -- are refusing to bear arms. Instead they opt to spend a year as social workers"⁹ Not only are there fewer men available in Germany, they are also increasingly less willing to perform military service. In 1995 the number of German men refusing to serve in the Bundeswehr exceeded those drafted for the first time. Claire Marienfeld, parliamentary ombudswoman for the armed forces, warned that within a few years the Bundeswehr would not be able to meet its annual draft quotas.¹⁰

In order to lure more young people into the armed forces, the

⁷Gregory Foster, et al., "Global Demographic Trends to the Year 2010: Implications for U.S. Security," The Washington Quarterly, 12, no. 2 (April 1989), 9.

⁸Yves Boyer, "Demographic Change, Political Priorities and Western Security," in Freedman and Saunders, eds., Population Change and European Security (London: Brassey's, 1991), 277.

⁹"Welcome To a Kinder Gentler German Army," International Herald Tribune (1996, Mar 28), 5.

¹⁰"Country Briefing, Germany," Jane's Defense Weekly 25, no. 12 (1996, Mar 20), 24.

Germans have resorted to changing how it treats recruits. Some in the German Army say it is too soft on the new soldiers. Compulsory national service will last 10 months instead of 12. Efforts will be made not to send recruits too far from home: those posted more than 50 miles away from their families will receive a monthly bonus of approximately 108 dollars.¹¹

Without the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War, this would have resulted in a change of NATO's Forward Defense strategy, causing more reliance on rear defense and mobilization of reserve units. With the reduction in threat to Western Europe, the mass armies once seen as needed for the defense of Europe are no longer required. In the case of a resurgent and belligerent Russia/Soviet Union, large pools of manpower may again be needed. While this may not be an anticipated threat in the near future, history has shown that it is not inconceivable.

Although the intensity of the confrontation has been weakened by recent events, it cannot be presumed that differences which have persisted so long in economic organization, political ideology and military alliance will entirely disappear in the near future, leading to a politically and economically homogeneous Europe free of the old rivalries.¹²

Military forces must not only compete for manpower, but also money. The aging population and decline in the numbers of younger workers mean that fewer workers will be available to support a growing

¹¹Mark Franchetti, "German Army Goes Soft to Lure Recruits," Sunday Times (London) (21 Jan 1996), Overseas News Section, from Lexus/Nexus.

¹²Saunders, 22.

retired class. Coupled with the growing costs of social programs and the current lack of job creation in Western Europe, it seems doubtful that the military will be able to continue to spend at today's rates in the future. It was announced in February, 1996 by French President Chirac that France's military would shrink from 500,000 to 350,000 men by the year 2002.¹³ This was, for the most part, a reaction to the country's \$59.3 billion deficit, and the need to reduce that debt by 1997 in order to qualify to join the common market currency by the year 2000.

In France, and the rest of Western Europe, cutting spending on the military and its industrial complex may be easier than trying to cut back on social security or health insurance. In the same address that he revealed the French military manpower cuts mentioned above, Chirac stated "We are in a time when expenditures have to be reduced. We are no longer threatened by an external invader."¹⁴ The Western Europeans do not seem ready to change their social welfare systems. When the French government attempted to change the rules for calculating state railroad worker's pensions in 1995, there was a national transportation strike that paralyzed the country.¹⁵

In November 1996, it was the private sector that acted when French truckers barricaded roadways and brought most of Europe's road

¹³French President Jacques Chirac spoke on 22 Feb 1996 in an address to reporters after a French governmental conference on the military. Craig Whitney, "Cold War Over, France Plans a Slim, Volunteer Military," New York Times (23 Feb 1996), A1.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

transport to a halt. Although the strike was illegal according to French law, it had strong public support and the government did not take any action to forcibly end the strike. The French government eventually made large concessions including a new retirement age of 55 for the drivers which will be partly financed by the government and is lower than France's statutory retirement age of 60.

This situation will only get worse, the French government is lucky that other sectors of the French economy did not jump on the bandwagon with the truck drivers and also demand concessions, although that possibility does exist in the future. Other countries, such as Germany and Spain, have also seen the spread of this type of anti-austerity protesting.

Even without earlier retirement ages, the numbers of Western European retirees will continue to grow, becoming a massive voting block, which has the potential to prevent the cutting of social programs simply by its size.

B. ECONOMIC IMPACTS

Both Germany's and France's social programs have built up gradually over a number of years. Their governments are heavily involved in the funding and provision of health services, education, transfer payments under social security, and welfare programs. In Germany these social costs now stand at nearly 40 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). If the present trends continue, German public pensions payments alone could account for over 14 percent of the country's GDP by the end of the century, swelling to nearly one-quarter of total economic output by 2030. By 2030 public expenditures

will be close to 50 percent of GDP.¹⁶

All major economies, except the U.S. and Japan, rely on pay-as-you-go public pension schemes, where those in work pay the pensions of the retired. "These schemes are already in deficit in the UK, Italy and Canada, and those in Germany and France are expected to follow soon."¹⁷

The percentage of workers to retirees is continuously growing smaller. Barring any changes to the country's social spending, this will cause the percentage of the worker's wages going to support social programs to rise steadily in the future.

The ratio of German workers to retirees in 1989 was 4:1, by 2010 the ratio will be 3:1 and by 2030 it will be less than 2:1. These figures are gloomier if the under 20 year old age group is added to the over 60 year old group. The ratio of workers to non-workers will be 3:2 by 2000. By 2030 non-workers will outnumber workers.¹⁸

Although Germany seems to be leading the pack in reduced worker to non-worker ratios, the numbers for France are roughly the same, as seen in Table 1.

As touched on earlier, there is much opposition to reducing the benefits that come from the German and French social welfare systems. In Germany, warning strikes were staged by public workers on May 20, 1996 as a "planned series that union officials say will lead to a 'hot

¹⁶Heino Fassbender, and Susan Cooper-Hedegaard, "The Ticking Bomb at the Core of Europe," The McKinsey Quarterly no. 3 (22 June 1993), 127.

¹⁷Roger Eglin, "A Time Bomb Ticks Under Government Finances," Management Today (Jan 1994), 24.

¹⁸Foster, et al., 9.

summer' for Chancellor Kohl - offering a measure of the depth of opposition to the German leader's insistence that his compatriots must abandon some of their comforts."¹⁹ The cuts intended to reduce Germany's budget deficit by 33 billion dollars are in response to both fulfilling economic conditions for a single European currency and the growing sense that "welfare spending and cosseted labor forces rob (Europe) of competitiveness in the global economy."²⁰

One element of the huge strain on welfare benefits in France and Germany is a direct result of fundamental demographic changes. When Bismarck introduced the current pension system 100 years ago with a retirement age of 65, the average German life expectancy was 45 years.²¹ In 1996, the average German life expectancy is 75 years, with 15 percent of the population over age 65. That percent is expected to double to 30 percent by 2030. Since Germany is seen as the "dynamo" of the European economy, the outcome of Germany's attempt to implement austerity measures may affect the rest of the European Union.

1. Loss of International Competitiveness

Even though a shrinking population would seem to mean less unemployment, this is not the case in France or Germany. In 1994 unemployment was 12.6 percent in France, while it was 8.2 and 13.5

¹⁹Allan Cowell, "German Public Workers Stage 'Warning Strike' on Fund Cuts," New York Times (21 May 1996), C5.

²⁰Alan Cowell, "Germany's Leader Calls For Big Cuts in Welfare State," New York Times (27 Apr 1996), A1.

²¹Whitney, (29 Sep 1996), A4.

percent in West and East Germany respectively.²² In March of 1996 a combined Germany's (former East and West) unemployment rose to 10.3 percent.²³ This is the highest jobless rate in Germany in almost half a century.

Besides the fact that there are fewer jobs available, there is also less incentive to go back to work in Germany and France as compared, for instance, to the U.S.

To illustrate the problem, take the case of a typical married man with two children who was employed at an average wage before losing his job. In France or Germany, he is eligible for benefits equal to more than 75 percent of his previous net income, including family allowances, for a period that is in practice unlimited. This compares to a ratio of benefits to previous income in a typical state in the U.S. of 55 percent, which falls after three months to 28 percent.

This helps explain why the long-term unemployed make up 50 percent of the European total, compared with less than 6 percent in the U.S. In effect, labor remains "parked" on the sidelines for long periods (or goes underground) rather than being quickly re-routed into another productive activity.²⁴

Many economists are beginning to argue that what the European welfare system produces most efficiently is unemployment. Most people in Western Europe put the blame for rising unemployment on the fact that they must compete worldwide against the labor markets of countries that pay much less per hour. Although this is true when

²²The World Factbook, 1995, (Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1995), 146, 160.

²³Nathanial Nash, "In Germany, Downsizing Means 10.3% Jobless," New York Times (7 Mar 1996), C1.

²⁴Fassbender and Cooper-Hedegaard, 39.

France and Germany are compared to less developed countries such as those in the Far East and Latin America, European wages are actually very similar to those of the United States and Japan. Government mandated non-wage costs, generous holiday pay and high payroll taxes, are what separate Europe from the rest of the industrialized world. According to the Cologne Institute, Germany's 1991 non-wage labor costs for the manufacturing sector were nearly triple those in the Japan and U.S.²⁵

Preserving existing jobs has been the top priority of Western European economics, although this strategy did not create new jobs. Between 1970 and 1990 the U.S. created 38.2 million net new jobs. During the same period the twelve European Economic Community members, with a larger combined labor force than the U.S., created less than one third as many jobs.²⁶ The result of this lack of job creation has been the higher European unemployment numbers.

The only employment sector in Western Europe that has grown appreciably in the last two decades has been the public sector, which has also added to the overall tax burden, while there has been almost no growth in private sector employment.²⁷ Table 2 shows that jobs were lost in 1992, even though the economies grew and in 1993 the job loss percentage exceeded the decline in economic growth.

The job loss is continuing. In Germany, a number of economists

²⁵Joel Haverman, and Norman Kempster, "The Case of the Disappearing Worker: What's Gone Wrong?" Los Angeles Times (6 July 1993), 1.

²⁶Fassbender and Cooper-Hedegaard, 127.

²⁷Haverman and Kempster, 1.

attributed the increase in unemployment to 10.3 percent in 1996 to "a stepped up campaign by companies to slash their employment in this country (Germany), and build plants outside Germany."²⁸

Table 2 Economic Growth (%) vs. Job Growth (%).

Country	1992		1993	
	Growth	Jobs	Growth	Jobs
Germany	+2.0	-1.7	-1.9	-2.4
France	+1.3	-0.5	-0.7	-1.0

Source: Los Angeles Times, July 6, 1993 from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

The employment problem in Europe is made worse by government regulations that act as disincentives for the hiring of new workers. These include heavy payments for health insurance, pensions and unemployment insurance. There are also such strong regulations protecting employees from being let go that companies only hire personnel when there is no other alternative.²⁹ Many studies have come to the conclusion that if Europe really wants to create more jobs it must become more like the U.S. "The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) analysis is that it must free its labor markets, lighten the burden of the welfare state and give freer rein to venture capital. In short it must become more

²⁸Nash, C3.

²⁹Craig Whitney, "Europe Isn't Divided in its Joblessness," New York Times (31 Mar 1996), E4.

entrepreneurial."³⁰ There are two problems however: doing that is very unpopular with many European workers, and it will take time to become effective, if it can be implemented at all.

In October 1996, Germany's fight over changes in the workplace shifted from a political discussion to actual bargaining between labor and management. An initial hard-line stance taken by three companies -- Daimler-Benz, Siemens and the General Motors Corporation's Opel subsidiary -- planned to take advantage of a new German law and immediately cut their workers sick pay by 20 percent without negotiating new contracts. One week after the companies' pronouncements, following Union protests where more than 100,000 workers took part in demonstrations and walkouts, the companies retreated and decided to open new contract talks with the metal workers' union. One factor that may have forced management to the bargaining table is the ardent opposition by workers to decreases in benefits. During the protests "many workers carried signs saying that they would rather fight like the French did last year than submit to 'American' worker benefits, which they deem inferior."³¹ Beyond maintaining their sick-pay benefits, the union is insisting on a 4.5 percent pay raise -- more than twice the rate of inflation.

France is again bracing for worker unrest in 1996, including a repeat of the two week national transportation strike that brought

³⁰Reginald Dale, "There Is No 'Third Path' for Europe," International Herald Tribune (5 Apr 1996), 17.

³¹Edmund Andrews, "New Hard Line by Big Companies Threatens German Work Benefits," New York Times (1 Oct 1996), A1.

most of the French economy to a standstill in 1995.³² In large part because of the economic policy of increased fiscal austerity, Prime Minister Juppe's conservative government is growing in unpopularity and faces defeat in France's 1998 elections. The French Public Opinion Institute released one poll showing 83 percent of the voters in favor of a change in economic policy. Other public opinion polls show support for government economic policies are below 30 percent.³³ If the conservative government were to lose the upcoming elections, France's attempted social welfare austerity measures will be seen as at least partly responsible. In any case, Politicians will be forced to think hard before they try to cut social programs again. If social programs can not be decreased other portions of the government budget may be reduced instead. So far, the military has been shown to be the budget that is easiest to cut.

2. Implications for European Integration

Western Europe's fiscal problems -- which are showing no signs of getting better and are caused in part by the aging populations and its associated social welfare programs -- may lead to a dissatisfaction with the further integration of the European Union. Further social program austerity measures, such as are seen in Europe today, have the potential to lead to popular alienation with the Maastricht Treaty and cause a reversal of the integration process.

³²Craig Whitney, "France Braces for Yet Another Autumn of Labor Unrest, Strikes," New York Times (29 Sep 1996), A4.

³³Ibid.

As seen in the recent German labor protests, a steel worker in Germany does not seem ready to give up his social welfare package in the name of Germany, much less to help pay price supports, for example, to a tuna fisher in Malta, something which could become a reality if Europe were fully integrated. Increasingly, Europeans are seeing the EMU as leading toward decreasing blue collar jobs and social benefits while increasing taxes. In Austria and Germany where social welfare programs are generous and strongly entrenched, increasing numbers of people believe that any new government austerity measures will attempt to cut those entitlements before anything else.³⁴

"The United States sees a European Monetary Union (EMU) as carrying a high risk of contributing to recession and thus political trouble, which has always been expensive for the world."³⁵ The countries of Europe had a hard time passing the Maastricht Treaty five years ago in national referendums. If the Treaty leads to increased economic hardship, popular support could be eroded to such an extent that it will become politically untenable to continue the process. This would, in turn bring about an increased tendency toward nationalism and decreased cooperation between Western European countries.

In October 1996, the Austrian Freedom Party won 28 percent of the

³⁴Alan Cowell, "Austria Vote: No to Europe," New York Times (15 Oct 1996), A9.

³⁵Rudi Dornbusch, "Euro Fantasies," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 5 (Sept/Oct 1996), 123.

vote in elections for the European Parliament legislatures.³⁶ The Freedom Party which appealed to the working class, ran an anti-EU campaign, saying that the EU would lead to the export of Austrian jobs and the importation of immigrants who either take away work or live on welfare.

In France the popular support for the government's economic policies has fallen below 30 percent. Even some of Chirac's own party members are unhappy with his austerity measures.³⁷ It is also likely that an anti-EU theme may be used by some of the more extreme parties in the next election campaign. This would, at the very least, increase the visibility of the anti-EU aspect of the political debate, perhaps leading to more popular support.

Officially Germany would like to see European integration continue, although knowing that they are one of the linchpins for further integration, Germany seems to be increasing its role on deciding how it will continue. "There have been hints from Germany's Christian Democrat ranks to other members of the European Union that Germany might pursue foreign policy aims of its own if European integration doesn't continue as Germany would like."³⁸ Since France sees itself as the unofficial leader of the European integration process, this would increase the friction between the two largest

³⁶Cowell, (15 Oct 1996), A9.

³⁷Whitney, (29 Sep 1996), 11A.

³⁸Christian Caryl, "Remember: No Goose Steps," U.S. News & World Report 121, no. 16 (21 Oct 1996), 56.

economies in Europe, France and Germany, and add to the problems that already plague any further economic integration.

C. IMMIGRATION TO WESTERN EUROPE

Today's largest migrations to Western Europe are largely tied to historical relationships between the sending and receiving countries. It is not always close proximity that decides which country migrants will end up in. France's former colonies in Northern Africa are one example of a relationship between countries leading to migration; another is Germany and Turkey, which were in close political alignment up to and during World War I.

In France, the more recent pressures for immigration control are in conflict with historical colonial benefits that were given to the colonized nations in the past. "After the cold war, the former colonial powers no longer had any reason to maintain commitments in their old spheres of power. They no longer have to defend the colonies against a competing power (the Soviet Union)."³⁹

The fast growing populations of Second and Third World countries have fed the growing migration to Western Europe. The people of poorer countries see greater opportunity and a better life outside their own increasingly overcrowded countries. Three main reasons for migration to Western Europe are the differences in wealth between the regions, the pressure of population, and the effects of civil war, famines or natural disasters.

³⁹Robert Miles and Dietrich Thranhardt, Migration and European Integration: the Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion (London: Pinter Publishers Ltd., 1995), 6.

During the 1950's and 1960's workers from the Third World were happily received by France and Germany to help drive the post-war boom. "This 'golden age' of post-war economic growth came to an end in the recession of 1974-75."⁴⁰

In the 1960's, there was an increase in investment and development in the Third World, helping growth in less developed countries. Since the 1980's, with the advent of official, treaty regulated economic blocks, there is a general movement of monetary capital to three main regions. The three regions are North America (NAFTA), Western Europe (EU), and East Asia. Although there is growing investment in the Third World, specific countries are being bypassed as recipients of investment. Foreign investment to Third World countries has tripled in the past five years, but these foreign investment flows remain highly selective. Most goes to Asia, the Pacific rim and Latin America. Sub-Saharan Africa has received only about three percent of all investments.⁴¹ Since the end of the Cold War, there is no need to subsidize countries to ensure they do not fall into the communist camp. Investment is therefore now more aligned toward economic profit.

The average annual change in per-capita GNP for the Middle East and North Africa was a negative 2.4 percent between 1980 and 1991.⁴² Increasing Third World unemployment will continue driving people to

⁴⁰Richard Mayne, ed., Western Europe (New York and Oxford, England: Facts on File Publications, 1986), 505.

⁴¹Paul Lewis, "Cutting Back in West, Corporations Invest in 3d World," New York Times (13 Mar 1996), C4.

⁴²Miles and Thranhardt, 19.

attempt to migrate to industrialized nations, although now there is also a lack of jobs at their destination, Western Europe.

The coming population increases in North African and Middle Eastern countries, coupled with the lack of opportunities, will also fuel the attempted immigration to Western Europe. While the forecasted population growth of Europe for the years 1991 to 2000 is 0.5 percent, it is projected that Turkey's population will rise to 100 million during the same time period. By the year 2020, the African continent's population is expected to more than double.⁴³

France and Germany are attempting to limit immigration and have succeeded in drastically reducing the numbers of people they grant asylum to. Germany has reduced the number of asylum applicants by around 90 percent, and new, tougher asylum rules were adopted by the European Union (EU) in 1993. Included now is a resolution proposed by the French in November 1995, that persecution by non-state agents -- Algeria's Islamic terrorists for instance -- does not count.⁴⁴

The problem is that many countries find that it is harder to keep determined people out than it might seem at first glance. As Robert Kaplan puts it: "Whatever the laws, refugees find a way to crash the borders, bringing their passions with them."⁴⁵ However, even if Europe is more successful than in the past at keeping unwanted immigrants out, which may be doubtful, the foreign populations will

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴"Go West and North If You Can," Economist 238, no. 7948 (13 Jan 1996), 52.

⁴⁵Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," Atlantic Monthly 273, no. 2 (Feb 1994), 62.

still grow larger as a proportion of the total population. This is because Europe's immigrants currently have a higher birth rate than non-immigrants.⁴⁶

Civil wars, strife and disasters are other reasons for migrations. "Paris is fearful that a huge influx of refugees, up to 500,000, would flee to France if the Islamic Fundamentalists take over in Algeria."⁴⁷ Western Europe has already seen more than 800,000 refugees from the former Yugoslavia, many granted "temporary" asylum in Germany.

1. Racism/Nationalism vs. Assimilation

Increases in nationalism and xenophobia within the host states can be explained not only by a rise in the number of insecure individuals who feel threatened by foreigners, but also by a growing perceived threat to the security of the collective identity.⁴⁸

One way the security threat is driven by the actions of the host countries is the behavior and policies of both official and non-official entities against the immigrant populations. Xenophobic rhetoric and activities tend to cause minorities to unite and form defensive organizations. These immigrant groups may then be further isolated from the host society and harder to assimilate.

⁴⁶Mayne, 505.

⁴⁷Lara Marlowe and Thomas Sancton, "Faith's Fearsome Sword," Time 143, no. 6 (7 Feb 1994), 49.

⁴⁸Gabrial Sheffer, "Ethno-National Diasporas and Security," Survival 36, no. 1 (Spring 1994), 64.

There are host societies which tend to accept new cultures and assimilate them more easily than others. France and Germany are very different when they are compared by this yardstick: who is allowed to join the society and how is this accomplished?

a. Differences in Assimilating New Cultures

The "native citizens" of France and Germany have different ideas of what makes a Frenchman or a German respectively. In France, culture defines the meaning of being French. To become a member of France's society one must become French culturally. Historically, there seems to be no bias against original ethnicity or skin color in this area. In a view that seems to reflect the way many French think, whether left or right politically, French anthropologist Emanuel Todd argued against Muslim girls wearing veils in school: "The message to Muslim girls must be: we want you to become French like the rest, so you can marry our sons. We must tell the children of immigrants that it is good to become French."⁴⁹

Toward the end of the 1960's the French government started to argue that it could no longer maintain an open-door policy with respect to immigration. After World War II, France was seen as a nation where immigrants were welcome and would be easily assimilated.⁵⁰ Now, the migration flows have changed from a largely intra-European mix to an Africa-to-France pattern. "The 'cultural

⁴⁹Bruce Wallace, "The Islamic Peril," Macleans 107, no. 48 (28 Nov 1994), 47.

⁵⁰Maxim Silverman, Deconstructing the Nation, Immigration, Racism and Citizenship in Modern France (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 73.

proximity' of the previous immigrants, which facilitated the process of assimilation, is contrasted to the 'cultural distance' of the new immigrants, which hampers assimilation and threatens social cohesion."⁵¹

Germany has a quite different idea than does France about what it means to be a citizen. In 1913, a law was passed that allowed citizenship only to those with German blood. German law today does not exclude the possibility of citizenship for non-Germans, although those who can prove German descent can become citizens quickly. "Citizenship can be withheld indefinitely from a Turk who has lived decades in Germany, paid taxes dutifully and speaks perfect German. Or it can be granted in a flash to a Russian of German descent whose forefathers left 300 years earlier but can't even order a beer in the native tongue."⁵²

Although, historically the German nation has been made up of a highly homogeneous population,⁵³ it may be slowly changing. Charges that citizenship laws are racist have pushed the German government to promise to pass laws making it easier for non-German residents to obtain citizenship.

One point which both Germany and France agree on, in the area of citizenship, is that they do not want people with divided loyalties in their countries. At the moment French citizens are allowed to

⁵¹Ibid., 73,74.

⁵²John Marks, "A German's Lot is Still an Exclusive One," U.S. News and World Report 118, no. 16 (24 Apr 1995), 48.

⁵³Ibid.

have dual nationality, and many of the three million Algerians living in France do so. However, the French government is worried about whether the immigrants' first allegiance is to Islam or France. In Germany, the government may make new citizens relinquish their old passports. Also, during the citizenship law debates, the German parliament said it will pay special attention to the question of whether a person can be a citizen of two countries at once.⁵⁴

b. Rise in Xenophobic Political Movements

Fears that immigrants are taking away the native workers' jobs, that they will undermine of social cohesion and order, increase cultural divisions, and cause increased crime and terrorism have fueled national-level prejudices in France and Germany. Both countries have seen the growth of right-wing groups in the government and apart from it. These groups, in a way, provide their own self-fulfilling prophesy. Whether they are violent or non-violent, their actions have the effect of angering and frightening the immigrant communities. This causes backlashes from the immigrants, and may provide some of the reasons for the growth of militancy where there were none before. "Prejudice is the greatest friend of extremists, says a Pentagon terrorism expert. The more anti-Islam sentiment that is expressed, the more it will drive people into the arms of extremists."⁵⁵

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Elizabeth Neuffer, "'Islamiphobia' in Europe Fuels Tensions, Isolation," Boston Globe (20 Jun 1995), 1, from Lexus/Nexus.

France's right-wing groups are more organized than Germany's and are largely aligned with the political party of Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front. Le Pen won 15 percent of the nationwide vote in the 1995 French Presidential elections.⁵⁶ His platform promised to "send the immigrants back where they came from to make room for three million unemployed French workers."⁵⁷

Charles Pasqua, a former French Minister of Interior, "believes that Islamic terrorists are the true threat to the Republic."⁵⁸ After the 1994 killing of five French officials in Algiers, he announced heavy policing in areas inhabited by large numbers of Muslims. "Critics of Pasqua's policy argue that he does not differentiate between militant Islamic parties that are responsible for killing foreigners in Algeria and those parties which condemn the killing."⁵⁹ They feel Pasqua's approach invited reprisals and the possible movement of the fight to French territory. In December 1994, Algerians did just that: four Algerian hijackers took control of a jetliner in France. The Algerians had planned to blow up the jet over Paris with 170 people aboard, until French commandos stormed the plane and killed all four of the terrorists.

A recent poll released by the French National Human Rights

⁵⁶Craig Whitney, "Europeans Struggle to Balance Old Ways with New Muslim Immigrants," New York Times (6 May 1995), A4.

⁵⁷Ibid., A5.

⁵⁸Wallace, 46.

⁵⁹Frances Ghiles, "Unease Inside Moslem Paris: How Immigrants are Coping with a Clampdown," Financial Times (1 Sep 1994), 3.

Commission underscores racial tensions in France: 71 percent of those polled believe Islamic extremism is too widespread in France's Muslim community; 62 percent said there were too many Arabs in France.⁶⁰ Right-wing parties attack Muslims for "stealing jobs from the local populace and also for having children at such a fast rate they would outnumber Europeans."⁶¹ One problem that is currently being brought up in France is the issue of polygamy practiced by African immigrants. In the current anti-immigrant mood the government is taking a hard line stance. The government has said it will only recognize one spouse and consider other marriages annulled.⁶²

This also has implications for the heavily indebted social welfare system. France pays for health care, education, and subsidies for children and pregnant women, regardless of their marital status. It is estimated that in the Paris area alone, 200,000 people live in polygamous families.⁶³

Compared to France, Germany has no cohesive right-wing movement or ideology under one dominant leader.⁶⁴ There is evidence that neo-Nazi groups were making efforts for greater coordination among themselves in 1994, although this has been tried unsuccessfully in

⁶⁰Neuffer, 1.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Marlise Simons, "In France, African Women are Now Fighting Polygamy," New York Times (26 Jan 1996), A1.

⁶³Ibid., A4.

⁶⁴Andrew McCathie, "Germany: Not all Gloom in Germany," Australian Financial Review (29 Oct 1992), 18, from Lexus/Nexus.

the past.⁶⁵ Even though the extreme right-wing groups in Germany are not organized at this time, they do keep in contact through magazines and local meetings.

After reunification, Germany saw a surge in violence, mostly from right-wing groups. In 1992, an average of three people a day were injured and between January and November, 17 people died as a result of the violence.⁶⁶ The Turks in Germany now face several kinds of violence including firebombing by militant Kurds as well as attacks by right-wing extremists.⁶⁷

In 1991, 36 percent of Germans voiced sympathies for right-wing groups whose programs emphasized action against foreigners.⁶⁸ Some Germans say that the government authorities have also shown astonishing patience with these groups.⁶⁹ 1992 was the year with the highest number of violent anti-immigrant incidents, and this caused

⁶⁵U.S. Department of State, "German Human Rights Practices, 1994," Country Reports (1 Feb 1995), Section 5.

⁶⁶A. Juhnke and A. Sivanandan, "The Hydra-Headed Monster of Germany; Rise of Right-Wing Violence," New Statesman & Society 5, no. 231 (4 Dec 1992), 12.

⁶⁷Marks, 48.

⁶⁸Douglas Klusmeyer, "Aliens, Immigrants and Citizens: The Politics of Inclusion in the Federal Republic of Germany; Extremism as a Result of Conflicting Efforts to Create a National Identity," Daedalus 122, no. 3 (22 Jun 1993), 81.

⁶⁹There has been more than one incident of German police standing idly by as extremists attacked the homes of immigrants. The government did not speak out against anti-immigrant actions and instead focused on reducing immigrants by tightening asylum procedures and border controls. They attempted to decrease the level of conflict by keeping the prospective victims out of the country. Juhnke and Sivanandan, 12.

the government to finally end their inaction.⁷⁰ Only in 1993 did the German government start acting strongly against the right-wing groups, mostly by prosecuting more cases of right-wing violence and imposing longer jail sentences after convictions. Although the German government outlawed four extremist parties, this only "causes the movements to change their letterhead."⁷¹ It is estimated that right-wing voter potential may be as high as 15 percent, and the potential still exists for increased violence.

2. Terrorism

One of the most visible security issues linked with immigrants is terrorism. The threat of terrorism on French soil because of the Algerian war has become real. "Tracts circulated in Algiers quote the armed wing of the outlawed Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) as saying that 'the war against France has become a legal obligation'."⁷² Although most of France's Muslims remain moderate, authorities are convinced that there is a growing minority that is influenced by religious extremists. France has over 3000 Muslim groups, most very benign, although there are extremist ones, including a militant Algerian group, which promises urban guerilla war if France does not embrace Islam.

Children of immigrants who feel rejected and repressed by the

⁷⁰T. Kielinger and M. Otte, "Germany: The Pressured Power," Foreign Policy no. 91 (22 Jun 1993), 50.

⁷¹Juhnke and Sivanandan, 12.

⁷²"Fundamentally Confused," Economist 334, no. 896 (7 Jan 1995), 41.

host country could also be targeted by militants. "Many young Muslims in ghettos are rejecting the model of Islamic communities that have integrated into European nations. A few want urban warfare to press demands for respect and opportunities."⁷³ Immigrant ghettos may become breeding grounds for terrorists. Racial clashes are increasing, unemployment is up to 40 percent for some immigrants and usually at least 10 percent higher than the native population.

"In France, a day spent in the concrete corridors of Mantes-la-Jolie illustrates the combustible mix of unemployment and despair, prejudice and lack of identity that makes Europe's Muslim Ghettos a likely target for Islamic extremists wishing to recruit for their cause."⁷⁴ Immigrants, some excluded from society and others rejecting integration into the host nation, may feel there are no prospects for the future. They no longer have ties to their parents' home country and many an individual could turn into "a young rebel in search of a cause, culture and country, a desperate militant with little to lose."⁷⁵ Gabriel Sheffer points out that terrorist activities are only the tip of a much larger iceberg of activities by stateless diasporas. Sheffer defines ethno-national diaspora as social and political entities that arise from migration. Stateless diasporas would be, for example, the Kurds in Germany and the Algerian Islamic militants in France. "The communities these groups establish in a

⁷³Mort Rosenblom, "Europe's Melting Pot Boils Over with Racism, Extremism, Terror," Associated Press (12 Nov 1995), from Lexus/Nexus.

⁷⁴Neuffer, 1.

⁷⁵Rosenblom.

host nation develop trans-state networks which serve to transfer resources that support irredentist, secessionist or national liberation movements."⁷⁶

France used the "absolute emergency act" in 1994 to allow the government to bypass the usual judicial procedures on the grounds of state security. The French deported an Algerian national who was an engineer at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS). He was accused of "actively supporting the forwarding and distribution of material destined for armed groups in Algeria."⁷⁷ On the whole, efforts by host countries, coalitions of host countries and even international organizations, such as Interpol, to contain these networks have been futile.

a. *Importation of Foreign Conflicts*

Both France and Germany have complex relationships with the minorities in their countries. There have already been many attacks in Germany by one group of immigrants against another. "Some two million Turks live in Germany, splintered along the same notions of identity that are increasingly dividing Turkey's 60 million people into camps of Alawites, Islamic fundamentalists, secularists and Kurdish separatists."⁷⁸ Both ethnic Turks and Kurds believe that

⁷⁶Sheffer, 64.

⁷⁷Declan Butler, "Scientists Support Expelled Researcher," Nature 372, no. 6501 (3 Nov 1994), 5.

⁷⁸Allen Cowell, "Bonn Fears Turks' Strife will Spread," New York Times (27 Mar 1995), A6.

Germany is favoring the other. On March 27, 1995, Germany suspended military arms sales to Turkey in protest of its campaign against the Kurds in Northern Turkey. This, along with the reluctance of Germany to expel Kurds convicted of crimes or refused asylum, has caused some Turks to believe that the German government is supporting the Kurdish Workers Party (PPK).⁷⁹ Kurds, on the other hand, cite Germany's outlawing of the PPK and prior sales of weapons to Turkey as showing that the German government favors the Turks. To add to the confusion, "the Turkish military coup in 1980 sent hundreds of Turkish extremists, both rightist and leftist, fleeing to Germany and elsewhere in Europe, where police officials say, they have formed well organized groups."⁸⁰ Germans are also concerned that as Turkey becomes increasingly fundamentalist in nature, the more Turkish problems and conflict will be imported to Germany.

France faces a possibly worse situation in Algeria. The Islamic fundamentalists are not only targeted against other immigrant populations in France, but also against France itself. As was noted earlier, the outlawed Islamic Salvation front (FIS) is calling the war against France a legal obligation.⁸¹ French citizens in Algeria are already prime targets, and 21 were killed in 1994. Three million people of Algerian heritage live in France, and many have come in illegally or overstayed their visas.

Algerian terrorism on French soil has happened in the past --

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹"Fundamentally Confused," Economist 334, no. 896 (7 Jan 1995), 41.

during the Algerian War before France gave Algeria its independence. Dalil Boubakeur, the rector of the Paris mosque and France's leading Moslem cleric, told the French newspaper Le Monde that "the French could soon see in every Muslim a potential terrorist...We are afraid of the return of the climate during the Algerian war."⁸² Baubakeur spoke those words only four months before terrorists hijacked the jetliner in Marseille, France, in December 1994.

D. POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON FUTURE POLITICAL/SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS

Western Europe's demographic changes will have consequences for the future political and security environment. With the Cold-War over, there will be both popular and political pressure on the government in an attempt to guarantee that domestic problems assume the highest priority. This will likely lead to changing political priorities brought about by domestic conflict and changes in the power base. Both these factors -- domestic conflict with the xenophobic right-wing violence and immigrant problems and power base changes with the increase in a larger voting block of older people -- can be seen taking place in Western Europe today. These same factors, particularly the increase in active minority groups, can also limit the ability of a country to perform military operations abroad.

A country that is relatively rich, such as France or Germany, cannot expect to isolate itself from encounters with other comparatively poorer countries in the same region, such as those in

⁸²"Deja Vu," Economist 332, no. 876 (13 Aug 1994), 45.

North Africa or Eastern Europe. "Growing populations do not voluntarily leave their neighbors alone and at ease within existing economic, political, and social frameworks."⁸³ This can be seen by the steady flow of illegal immigrants into France and Germany from neighboring regions. Even though Europe is in an economic recession, it is comparatively well off when measured against North Africa and Eastern Europe.

While France and Germany do not necessarily fear a military attack by these countries any time in the near future, destabilization in those regions will lead to massive movements of war refugees and the increased probability of conflicts being imported into Western Europe. Some countries, such as France, are looking to advanced military technology as a way to make up for decreased manpower, although there may be limitations to the type, of operations which can be attempted and overall effectiveness of the forces.

1. Changing Political Priorities

With the increase in domestic problems such as right-wing violence, immigrant agitation, and imported civil strife, combined with a lack of resources, there could be a forced shift in governmental priorities. There is likely to be increased attention to domestic problems to the detriment of foreign affairs.

Important issues, such as the lack of economic growth in Third World countries and the population increases in Africa, which will

⁸³McNeill, 51.

only fuel the push for immigration to Western Europe, may be ignored. Domestic problems may swamp the political process, preventing long-term policy innovation to deal with problems at their source and relying instead on knee-jerk reactions.

2. Changing Power Bases

As it stands now, a major power base change will take place in the near future, in both France and Germany. The older generation will gain more power because of the increase in the overall percentage of people over the age of 65 with an additional increase by the lowering of the retirement age, in some cases to age 55. This is likely to have a major impact on political decisions. One effect may be that it could become practically impossible to cut social spending, especially in the areas of pensions and health care.

Another change in the power structure might come from the increase in numbers of second- and third-generation immigrants. Even if all immigration were cut off as of today, because of the higher relative fertility rates of the immigrants already in France and Germany there would be an increase in the percentage of the immigrant groups as compared to the host population. Although the immigrants will not, in the foreseeable future, become a majority, they may compromise a large voting block. If their numbers grew large enough, they could force the governments to include them in political decisions. How this could affect the nation would depend on how well these children of immigrants are assimilated into the culture of the host state.

3. Limited Ability of a Country to Operate Abroad

The increase of active minority groups, whether religious, ethnic or political, could limit the ability of France and Germany to operate in other countries. There is also the possibility that this minority could become a popular majority in certain situations.

Western European countries may not want to get involved in regions where the European public sees no immediate security concerns. There were feelings expressed in France (predominately espoused by Le Penn's National Front) that Iraq was a far away country and Kuwait was a problem between Arabs, for Arabs to solve. Any conflict could lead to large public opposition if more than a few casualties were taken with no clear and convincing security interest. Operations far from Europe will also be very expensive, perhaps leading to increased budget stresses. These factors could lead to loss of public support and include much of the main stream population in the future, not only the extreme edges.

Social cohesion is an important factor when fighting wars with limited aims. "Cohesion in any society will be threatened by a war which is being prosecuted unsuccessfully, or incompetently for purposes which are either obscure or barely taken seriously by public opinion."⁸⁴ The farther away these wars are from home and the less a direct link can be made to national interests, the harder it will be for a government to maintain social support for the use of troops. This, perhaps also combined with an active minority group against the

⁸⁴Lawrence Freedman, "Demographic Changes and Strategic Studies," in Freedman and Saunders, eds., Population Change and European Security (London: Brassey's, 1991), 17.

military action, will cause domestic dissension and decreased support by the public.

France serves as the home to more than three million Muslim immigrants and Germany has large numbers of increasingly Islamic fundamentalist Turks. Whether from the spread of Islamic fundamentalism or as a backlash against right-wing nationalism, there is an increase in militancy in Europe's Islamic populations. This could be further intensified if the Moslim populations are not assimilated into the host society.

Algerian fundamentalist groups have forced France from the government's original hard line support of the military regime in Algeria. Also, Germany seems to be walking a tightrope between the Turks and the Kurds.

During the Gulf War France saw surprisingly little sectarian friction although there were large anti-French demonstrations in the Maghreb towns of Rabat and Algiers. This racial calmness was "thanks notably to the studied carefulness of the government and the leaders of the Islamic Community. The countries of the Maghreb were overwhelmingly pro-Iraq, which is why France made sure that it was seen as trying harder than others to arrive at a peaceful settlement, until the eve of Desert Storm."⁸⁵ The question is, can this arrangement with the Islamic leadership last, and what are the implications of "never discounting Islamic views in policy-making" going to be for the U.S. in the future. A feeling for the future can

⁸⁵Francois Heisbourg, "France and the Gulf Crises," in Gnesotto, Nicole and Roper, eds., Western Europe and the Gulf (Paris: The Institute for Security Studies, 1992), 19.

be gained by France's refusal to allow U.S. military aircraft to overfly French territory during the Libyan strike, and its non-support of the September 1996 U.S. air strikes against Iraq.

An increase in terrorism is a factor that already affects France and will also become more of a concern for Germany in the future. Because of its Second World War history, Germany has not normally taken a strong position in foreign affairs. Now, with reunification and the end of the Cold War it has found itself in a new situation, that of having to play much more of a part in world politics, including sending troops abroad. This will increase Germany's chances of becoming a possible terrorist target in the future. Germany has seen Turkey's internal problems spreading into Germany itself. With its increasingly global interests, Germany may be targeted by organizations or countries that are in opposition to its policies, much like the U.S. and France are now. Germany may be left out in the cold if France declines to get involved in potentially divisive conflicts that affect Germany but not France. In this situation, there is a chance that another country such as France will not risk the problems that will come with siding with Germany.

In future foreign conflicts the increase in the militancy of Western Europe's Muslims (or other alien groups) could lead to worse strife than seen up to now. The conflict does not need to be an armed confrontation; it could be something as benign as an economic embargo of another country. If the opposition within a country is severe enough to make foreign conflict not worth the trouble, it could cause the war to be lost at home.

All Western European countries are faced with immigration

pressures of some sort that show no sign of abating. Alienation of these minorities because of the economic and nationalistic pressures is a real possibility. "The clash of cultures that some have predicted for the next century may not take place at the frontiers where the cultures meet, but rather, as events in France suggest, inside the borders of the Western states."⁸⁶ In the Western Europe of the future, there is a distinct possibility of clashes not only inside the nation as Viorst suggests, but also on the borders.

4. Declining Population Countries with Expanding Populations on Their Borders

Population growth south of the Mediterranean Sea will continue to increase well into the 21st century, while at the same time it will slow north of the Mediterranean.

By 2015, there will be 3.1 million births each year in the North African countries of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. The number of births in Spain, France and Italy at the same time will be 1.6 million.

In the same North African countries the number of children under the age of 15 will rise from 24 million in 1985 to 45 million in 2015. In Spain, France and Italy the numbers are 32 million in 1985 decreasing to 25 million in 2015.

In Egypt and Turkey alone have as many births per annum (1.8 million each) as the 12 countries of the EU.⁸⁷

This demographic vitality of the North African and Middle Eastern countries should cause the Western European countries to attempt to be proactive in their foreign policies and security arrangements. The

⁸⁶Milton Viorst, "The Muslims of France," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 5 (Sept/Oct 1996), 96.

⁸⁷Boyer, 272.

rise of fundamentalist Islam in these areas will only complicate the problem. "The image of conflict between the rich North and the poor South, bursting with excess population, is overstated if only because the South is not a coherent political grouping and is incapable of organizing itself as such. The prospect is not of a global 'class struggle' -- perhaps taking over from the Cold War -- but a series of localized and painful encounters."⁸⁸

Western Countries have historically been embarrassed in guerrilla conflicts where population differences did not make a big difference. Public sentiment regarding the ability to absorb casualties and miscalculations of their adversary's abilities to do the same were elements that helped lead to the outcomes of France's conflicts in Vietnam and Algeria and the U.S. experience during the Vietnam conflict.

With the exceptions of the "grand purpose"⁸⁹ wars, World Wars I and II, the ability to tolerate casualties has changed in western democratic countries in the twentieth century. "A certain tolerance for casualties was congruent with the demography of preindustrial and early industrial societies, whereby families had many children and losing some to disease was entirely normal. The loss of a youngster in combat, however tragic, was therefore fundamentally less unacceptable than for today's families, with their one, two, or at

⁸⁸Freedman, 288.

⁸⁹Edward Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995), 113.

most three children."⁹⁰

Because of this adverse reaction to casualties, western countries may have trouble facing societies that are driven by ultra-nationalism or religious fanaticism. In today's world -- and for the foreseeable future -- countries and societies that tend to have intense beliefs also tend to be undeveloped and have high-birthrates. Another difference is the cost of training, outfitting and supplying a professional soldier in a modern army. Both politically and fiscally, there is a very large disparity between losing one soldier from a developed country and one from a less developed society.

For conflicts that better fit the western idea of war, the evidence is that numbers alone do not make the difference. Prior to the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein stated what was also on many U.S. military planner's minds, that Iraq could win because the Iraqi people would accept many more war casualties than the Americans.⁹¹ While the U.S. led coalition still had to put troops on the ground, in this instance technological superiority was used to great effect. The Gulf War may have been a unique war in that it was very badly fought by the Iraqis. However, the larger question is whether it is premature to conclude that mass armies are a thing of the past.

There are three avenues that the countries of Western Europe can use to prevent conflict between themselves and more populous countries in the future. These tactics include diplomatic, military and cultural approaches.

⁹⁰Ibid., 115.

⁹¹Freedman, 289.

In the diplomatic area governments can seek to limit high technology weapons from spreading to these areas. One example of this is the Missile Technology Control Regime of 1987 to avoid the spread of ballistic missiles with ranges above 300 kilometers and capable of delivering a nuclear warhead.⁹² Another diplomatic process would be to cultivate good relations with the target countries. This process would have to include economic aid and cooperation in an attempt to help the other country grow economically.

Military means could be to invest in force-multiplying weapons (discussed in more detail in the next section).

Cultural methods would include active measures to assimilate immigrants in the country. If the immigrants are brought into the society of a host country, they will be less likely to act against that society.

5. Effects of New Technologies

One question brought up by this discussion is "Can new technology overcome the effects of decreased population growth?" It stands to reason that if one country has higher technology weaponry it should be able to act at greater ranges than its opponent and with more lethality. It should also be able to do this with fewer people. One good example of this was the British ability to overcome much larger populations during their colonial period.

France is currently interested in "providing its military units with greater strategic mobility and long-range precision weapons,

⁹²Boyer, 274.

although this is for limited interventions in Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe, not because of planning for a major war in Europe."⁹³ Military experts are also looking at high technology weapons systems as being able to provide highly effective military strikes without the political dilemmas associated with nuclear weapons.⁹⁴ By increasing their reliance on high technology weapons as a way to remain militarily effective with fewer personnel, countries such as France and Germany must plan for the support and maintenance of the force involved.

In World Wars I and II, countries saw an increase in men needed to support each division of combat troops as the technology improved. In WWI a divisional slice was 60,000 men. That is for 15,500 combat troops an additional 34,500 supply and support men were needed. In WWII the divisional slice increased to 65,000 men.⁹⁵ While the combat effectiveness was raised as technology increased, likewise, the number of support personnel involved also grew. Today in NATO, the combat slice as a percentage of overall forces is even smaller and while its combat effectiveness has also grown higher than in the past, the percentage of support forces are comparatively larger. Presently there are no new technologies that could affect the number of support

⁹³David Yost, "France," in Douglas Murray and Paul Viotti, eds., The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, Third ed., 1994), 249.

⁹⁴Ibid., 250.

⁹⁵Brian Bond, "Demography and War: A Military Historian's Perspective," in Freedman and Saunders, eds., Population Change and European Security (London: Brassey's, 1991), 201.

forces needed by the military.⁹⁶

As the number of combat personnel declined, numbers of maintenance people grew in order to service the higher technology weapons.

"Already in the United States Air Force 28 percent of the enlisted personnel are used for maintenance duties."⁹⁷ If this is the case with the next generation of technology, France and Germany would be forced to field smaller forces with more lethal weapons, which may lack the necessary support to be a fully effective and sustainable fighting organization.

6. Military Manpower

Different missions that may be faced by western countries in the future will also affect the number of personnel needed. High technology may not be able to change the fact that a large military presence is needed in certain operations such as truce enforcement and area occupation. Examples of this today are Northern Ireland and Bosnia, with Iraq as an example that might have happened if different decisions had been made.

The ratio of soldiers + police : to population in Northern Ireland was roughly 20:1000. When the number of active opponents in Northern Ireland (estimated at 1500) was taken into account the ratio dropped to 20:1. Where local military forces are stronger and more capable than Northern Ireland, the 20:1000 ratio would be insufficient.

Solder to space ratios are also relevant. Nevertheless, the Northern Ireland ratio of 20:1000 would suggest a minimum peacekeeping force of 90,000 soldiers

⁹⁶Boyer, 277.

⁹⁷Ibid.

be used to police the Vance-Owen plan in Bosnia. It also suggests that NATO forces in Bosnia today are too weak to enforce the political provisions of the Dayton accords, particularly the return of refugees to their former homes, if the warring parties do not implement them voluntarily.⁹⁸

Using the British experience in Northern Ireland as a basis for comparison with the U.S.-led Western coalition in Iraq, an estimate can be made of the number of personnel needed to occupy that country after the Gulf War. Iraq, with its population of 20.6 million people, would have required at least one-half million occupation troops at the 20:1000 ratio. Even if this occupation force was halved to 250,000 men, it is very doubtful whether the Western countries would have been either able to man or willing to pay for this operation.

Once assembled, this force must also be moved to the area, re-supplied and in most operations, eventually rotated back to the home country with different replacement troops taking their place. These logistical operations will also be more complicated in undeveloped countries such as Rwanda or Somalia.

Two other options to increase total numbers of forces are to attempt to assimilate other demographic sectors, such as women and immigrants, into the armed forces or rely more on Gurkha-type forces. Women are already being integrated into some European forces although there are certain countries that have not, such as Germany and Britain. At the very least, if used only as support and staff troops, female personnel could greatly increase the pool of possible forces in

⁹⁸Barry Posen, "Military Responses to Refugee Disasters," International Security 21, no. 1 (Summer 1996), 105.

the future.

France already has Ghurka-type forces with the Foreign Legion, although they only constitute a relatively small percentage of the total force. "Using a combination of options, France or Germany could use prospective immigrants, who renounced their national allegiance, attracted by an offer of citizenship after a period of service."⁹⁹ Edward Luttwak has proposed the same type of arrangement for the U.S., although for different reasons.¹⁰⁰ Besides bringing numbers of personnel into the forces, this could perform the task of assimilating immigrants into the country.

By actively attempting to bring immigrants into its armed services, France and Germany would give young immigrants a chance to overcome the high unemployment that currently is seen in their populations. This would also allow for more rapid assimilation into the national culture for the people chosen. A person coming out of a nation's military will have a greater chance of being more patriotic toward that country, be better educated, more likely to accept the native culture and, perhaps most importantly, pass the culture along to his/her children. While this is not an end-all solution; it will benefit the nation by assimilating immigrants, the military by increasing available manpower, and immigrants as a way out of high unemployment.

⁹⁹Edward Luttwak, "Where are the Great Powers?" Foreign Affairs 73, no. 4 (July/Aug 1994), 28.

¹⁰⁰In what he calls an improbable scheme, Luttwak proposes that the U.S. might use Ghurka or other nonnative troops to overcome the U.S. aversion to casualties.

III. IMPACT OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY

There are two areas where the demographic changes detailed in the preceding chapter may have implications in Western European countries taking part in military operations alongside the U.S. and acting as allies. One is their willingness to take part in "out of area operations" because of internal or external political considerations. The other is their ability to contribute to military operations within the constraints of military forces and assets available for use.

The 1996 National Security Strategy states: "The Administration's defense strategy, which requires U.S. forces to be able to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression in concert with regional allies in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts, has proved realistic."¹⁰¹ The addition of the statement "in concert with regional allies" is new to the U.S. national strategy and reflects a growing realization that with its smaller force posture the U.S. may not be able to handle larger regional contingencies alone. The U.S. is therefore planning on its allies to contribute forces.

In a time of general emergency, such as war, countries will do and spend whatever they have to, to oppose a direct threat to their survival. In Western Europe today, there is no external menace that directly threatens the security of any NATO ally. With their current budget problems, neither France or Germany can justify keeping large

¹⁰¹The White House, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," 4.

land armies to oppose a defunct Soviet Union. The rise of a newly belligerent Russia has been briefly discussed. In Europe there is currently not enough support for this scenario as a reason to keep the armed forces at their Cold War levels.

As Western Europe focused on fighting the USSR in Europe during the Cold War, its capabilities for mounting flexible operations throughout the globe decreased. While Europe relied on large land armies -- and in the case of France and the UK a nuclear deterrent -- important elements that make up a truly global force capable of power projection were left out. These elements include logistics, strategic troop transport, global communications networks, space based intelligence assets and even medical evacuation capabilities. These components were not needed if the battle would take place in or near Western Europe. There was also no need to spend the money on these assets if the United States was providing them to alliance partners as needed.

The Soviet collapse, coming as quickly as it did, caught France and Germany with large land armies configured for mass war on the European Continent.¹⁰² Add this to the internal problems of need for increased social spending because of an aging population and the expectation of a peace dividend at the end of the Cold War. There will inevitably be many different ideas about where the government should spend its limited resources.

Although France, Germany and Britain are working to restructure

¹⁰²Sherard Cowper-Coles, "From Defense to Security: British Policy in Transition," Survival 36, no. 1 (Spring 1994), 143.

their military forces, they are also cutting significant amounts of both manpower and money from their services. The fiscal decreases will have an especially negative effect on the ability of those countries to build a significant power projection force. This leads to the conclusion that multinational units such as the Eurocorps will remain ineffective or at the best, still almost wholly reliant on U.S. support. NATO officials believe that without a major U.S. role, the Western Europeans will only be capable of simple peacekeeping or constabulary missions in the foreseeable future.¹⁰³

NATO is also moving toward changing its mission to include out-of-Western-European-area operations. If this continues to be the case, NATO will need forces that are able to react to extra-European contingencies. They will have to be able to move to the conflict area quickly, have the capability to resupply -- perhaps with an extended logistical tail, perform as an effective fighting force, provide intelligence and rotate in fresh troops -- as needed -- in case of an extended operation. Additionally, this may have to be done with a minimum of U.S. support, if available assets are already engaged supporting U.S. or other allied troops, in that particular conflict or for another contingency. Presently it does not seem likely that France or Germany will be able to afford the military expenditures that would make out-of-area military action without U.S. assistance possible.

¹⁰³R. Atkinson and B. Graham, "Allies Look Impotent Without U.S., NATO Says," International Herald Tribune (30 Jul 1996), News Section, from Lexus/Nexus.

A. DEFENSE SPENDING IN FRANCE AND GERMANY

Since 1990, NATO's European members have been cutting their defense budgets. On a percentage basis these cuts have been less than U.S. defense cuts. Of the \$470 billion spent on defense in 1995 by all 16 alliance members, the U.S. defense budget still accounted for 59 percent, or \$278 billion.¹⁰⁴ While this leaves Western European countries still spending a large amount on defense, their continued need to rely on U.S. support is a function of how their money is spent.

In 1995 the United States spent \$35.4 billion on defense research and development, or 14 percent of the Pentagon budget, compared with \$13.6 billion spent by European NATO countries combined, or 8.3 percent of their collective defense budgets. For some allies, including Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal and Turkey, such spending was either nil or nearly so.

Over the last decade, the United States also devoted a larger portion of defense expenditures to equipment purchases - about 25 percent - than any of the allies. Some European powers have substantially reduced their spending in this area.¹⁰⁵

Cuts in nonmilitary spending already have spawned massive domestic protests in Europe. But deferring the goal of defense independence by cutting military spending provokes little opposition. "It is true that you have some countries in Europe that are completely relying on American protection and have abandoned any idea of their own defense, a French defense official said. They have paper headquarters and

¹⁰⁴ Atkinson and Graham.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

paper armies."¹⁰⁶

The French experience in the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, its largest out-of-area troop deployment in more than 25 years, had a large impact on their security policy. Since General Charles de Gaulle returned to power in France in 1958, France has put great emphasis on being seen as a world power. After Gulf War, France realized that it could not continue to remain a world leader with a Cold War army.¹⁰⁷ This can be seen in France's willingness to reduce both its manpower requirements and the funding to its nuclear deterrent forces.

The French military budget plan caps annual spending on the military at Ffr185 billion per year in 1995 Francs, (35 billion dollars) for the years 1997 to 2002. It will also limit annual equipment spending to \$16 billion, a cut of about four billion dollars a year.¹⁰⁸ Investing in new and additional equipment -- transport, communication and intelligence -- is an integral part of reshaping a predominately land force into a global force. By cutting their equipment budget, France will not be able to achieve its goal of regaining its status of being a global power.

Germany's 1996 defense budget is being cut by DM 1.25 billion (\$750 million) to DM47.1 billion, further cuts to DM46 billion are

¹⁰⁶Ibid.

¹⁰⁷Heisbourg, 18.

¹⁰⁸David Buchan, "French Cabinet Approves Defense Cuts: Chirac Aims to Create Professional, More Cost-Efficient Model Forces," Financial Times (14 May 1996), 2.

expected in 1997.¹⁰⁹ In its first non-UN military operation outside its own country, Germany is faced with finding DM700 million to pay for the Bundeswehr operations in Bosnia. This is a large amount in a decreasing defense budget of DM46 billion for a comparatively small number of troops (4000) and for a short time. This leads to the realization of the problems Europe's largest economy would have if it were to contribute substantial forces, perhaps one division or even more, to an Iraqi-like operation. If current trends continue, a larger deployment of troops by Germany would also lead to increased debt or reductions in other government programs.

B. PROBABLE FORCE POSTURE EVALUATION

When available force numbers in Western Europe are taken and the support troops -- training, logistics, medical, and other support forces -- are accounted for and subtracted from the total, the number of actual deployable forces is greatly reduced. An estimate at this time would give Western European countries only 4 to 7 division equivalents (NATO) that could be rapidly and capably deployed away from Europe. The breakdown would be roughly: UK - 1 division, Germany - 1 to 1.5 divisions, and France - 3 divisions.¹¹⁰ This number, of

¹⁰⁹"Front Line Safe As Germany Cuts Defense by \$750m," Jane's Defense Weekly 25, no. 22 (29 May 1996), 3.

¹¹⁰The estimates were made by taking brigades available for rapid reaction deployment out of the region and subtracting the brigades needed for turnaround, training and other support functions. In Germany for example, there are eight brigades (3 mechanized, 4 light and the German portion of the German-French brigade) available for rapid reaction out of the region. At any one time one-third of these brigades would be able to deploy, approximately one to one and one-half division equivalents. The German brigade numbers come from "Umgliederung des Heeres in die Struktur für das 'Neue

actual deployable forces, includes the support personnel incorporated in those deploying forces which would further decrease the number of combat troops available.

Western European governments are in the process of changing their defense policies. During the Cold War the main, if not only, mission of Western European military organizations was primarily to defend Western Europe. With a few exceptions - UN missions, Falklands War, and Northern Africa - the military roles did not include out-of-area operations. When there was a need to unilaterally use military forces out of area, European governments had to scrape forces and equipment together. They also were reliant on certain U.S. assets such as logistics and satellite intelligence. "The only wars France has successfully handled on its own in recent decades have been minor interventions in Africa, and U.S. logistical support has been necessary even for some of these interventions."¹¹¹ In the Gulf war, French troops were praised for successfully completing their missions, although "analysis by French experts and opposition politicians note that the missions assigned to the French forces were circumscribed in advance by the limitations of French military equipment and by the relatively modest size of the French units deployed to the Gulf."¹¹²

France's 1992-94 draft military program-law states that the third of three principle missions assigned to the armed forces is "to be

Heer fur neue Aufgaben" ...ins Presseforum (6 Feb 1996), from BMVg online at www.bmvg.government.de/presseforum.

¹¹¹Yost, (1994), 244.

¹¹²Ibid., 270.

able to conduct operations outside of Europe. The French retain a great -- and understandable -- reluctance to conceive of the possibility of a major war in Europe, and most discussion concerns possible limited interventions in Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe."¹¹³

European military roles are currently in transition to include more emphasis on out-of-area mission planning. Britain's 1992 white paper unveiled three new overlapping roles for the armed forces: to ensure the protection and security of the UK and its dependent territories, even when there is no major external threat; to insure against any major external threat to the UK and its allies: and to contribute to the promotion of the UK's wider security interests through the maintenance of international peace and stability.¹¹⁴

French Prime Minister Alain Juppe has proposed a European Army of 350,000 troops and that it should be subordinated to the European Union for rapid reaction-type roles.¹¹⁵ In this model, each of the major European military nations -- France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK -- would provide between 50,000 and 60,000 men. These rapid reaction troops would ultimately be under the Western European Union, which, in turn, many European politicians want to be controlled by the European Union.

France is in the process of restructuring its armed forces,

¹¹³Ibid., 249.

¹¹⁴Cowper-Coles, 147.

¹¹⁵Marc Rogers, "The IGC: Committed to Creating a Common Foreign Capability," Jane's Defense Weekly 25, no. 13 (27 Mar 1996), 18.

including ending compulsory service, possibly giving it a more mobile and rapidly deployable force. France's military will go from 500,000 in 1995 to a planned 350,000 in 2002. The bulk of these cuts will come from the Army which will lose an estimated 96,000 personnel. "This will result in a third of France's 124 regiments being disbanded, leaving many towns and regions to face economic decline. Critics argue that the threat of labor unrest could easily temper the governments enthusiasm for standing down regiments and closing factories, compromising Chirac's timetable for change."¹¹⁶

France's current nine divisions will also be disbanded, and reorganized into four separate forces consisting of an armoured group, a mechanized group, a rapid armoured intervention force and an infantry assault force.¹¹⁷ The objective of this French military reform is for France to be able to deploy 50,000 to 60,000 soldiers out of the European region.¹¹⁸ As of 1996, France's most easily deployable force was the Foreign Legion with 8,500 men. "We had to beg, borrow and steal from 47 separate regiments to put together a 15,000 man intervention force during the war in the Persian Gulf, said Pierre Lellouche, a conservative member of the French parliament."¹¹⁹ However one analyst noted:

¹¹⁶J. Lewis, "All Change for France: How the Big Shake-out Will Shape-up," Jane's Defense Weekly 25, no. 21 (13 Mar 1996), 19.

¹¹⁷Ibid., 19.

¹¹⁸Whitney, (23 Feb 1996), A1.

¹¹⁹Ibid.

The biggest problem the Europeans face today is not the size of their forces, but the fact that they can't move them where and when they need them, said a NATO planner in Brussels. Every mile you move away from the continental Europe, the dependency on the United States increases - for transportation, for logistics, for command and control, for a lot of other things. In a way, they've become more dependent on the United States than ever.¹²⁰

The growing call on France's combat manpower has meant that a small number of elite troops have been almost permanently mobilized in different theaters for years on end. The French debate of Bosnian intervention, at times calling for unilateral French action was tempered by former Chief of the General Staff Maurice Schmitt using The Military Balance to argue that the former Yugoslav army was bigger and better equipped than that of France.

In the future, the French are going to rely on their Rapid Action Force based in France to fulfill the duties formerly allotted to the locally based troops.¹²¹ In another economy measure caused by cuts in France's military budget, the number of French troops in Africa will be decreased by more than half. This will leave in place only 5,500 of the 12,500 troops now permanently stationed in Africa. These troops were placed in Africa under long-standing bilateral defense pacts between Paris and its former African colonies.¹²² This may cause France to have to eventually back out of a number of these military

¹²⁰Atkinson and Graham.

¹²¹"Debating the Merits of National Service," Jane's defense Weekly 24, no. 16 (21 Oct 1995), 28.

¹²²J. Lewis, "France to Withdraw 7000 Troops from Africa," Jane's Defense Weekly 24, no. 24 (16 Dec 1995), 4.

accords.

By French law, draftees cannot be sent overseas against their will. In the past, when asked, only one in six draftees agreed to be deployed overseas. This resulted in France's 240,000 man army being less employable for overseas deployments than a significantly smaller all professional army of 100,000.¹²³ It remains to be seen how many of these deployable troops are actual combat troops as opposed to support forces. Also, the one question that nobody seems to be asking is what would happen if the deployment is longer than anticipated. What troops would be rotated in to replace the original forces? The answer to the second question will most likely be: If the mission is important enough to them, either they will scrape up enough soldiers from home-based units -- as happened initially in Iraq -- to replace those on deployment, they may simply be forced to leave the same troops in place, or they may withdraw.

Germany is concerned that France's plans to end conscription and turn its army into an intervention force will leave Germany as the only NATO member with a military force large enough to defend its own territory. Germany is worried that the French are relying on them to protect France in the case of a European conflict, at least in the early stages, until France can re-institute the draft. This has caused Germany to rethink plans for expanding military co-operation with France in favor of a reorientation towards the U.S. and

¹²³Whitney, (23 Feb 1996), A1.

Britain.¹²⁴

German Defense Minister, Volker Ruehe, says that Germany does not wish to pursue a strategy that would allow it to deploy a large number of personnel to world trouble spots. Contrary to that statement is the fact that Germany, which is also reducing its armed forces from 370,000 to 338,000 soldiers in peacetime, is planning on restructuring its forces to include a 53,600 man crisis reaction force. The main difference from France is that Germany will maintain the draft, which will enable it to build up a mobilization strength of an estimated 500,000 men.¹²⁵ However, out-of-area operations are very different from territorial defense. Procurement of assets for a rapid reaction force will not be cheap. If Germany is going to continue its conscription policy thereby maintaining its main defense posture, it may have to eventually decide which mission is more important, main defense or rapid reaction, and which one will get the money.¹²⁶

One sign that Germany has already made that decision is the reduction of its heavy forces. Under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) Germany is allowed to have 4,166 Battle Tanks. With the current downsizing, Germany only needs and can only man

¹²⁴Robin Gedy, "Bullying Rises in German Army," The Daily Telegraph (6 Mar 1996), 13 from Lexus/Nexus.

¹²⁵Kathleen Buntin, "From Conscripts to Crises Reaction Forces," Jane's Defense Weekly 25, no. 12 (20 Mar 1996), 24.

¹²⁶"Country Briefing, Germany," Jane's Defense Weekly 25, no. 12 (20 Mar 1996), 24.

approximately 3,074 tanks, including reserves.¹²⁷

Until 1994, German forces had been barred from operating outside of the NATO area. In 1994, Germany's Constitutional Court reinterpreted the Basic Law,¹²⁸ leading to deployment of German Troops abroad. Germany is showing signs of increased participation in global politics which has included deploying troops to Somalia and Bosnia. Prior to the court's reinterpretation, most citizens and politicians believed that Germany could not deploy troops outside of NATO's boundaries. A February 1996 report by Ruehe stated that "Germany is no longer threatened by a land attack but faced regional conflicts in and outside Europe that could undermine its security. Germany's armed forces must gear up to become capable of playing a full role in international military missions by the year 2000."¹²⁹

Britain will cut Defence expenditures by 26 percent in 1996/97 compared to its 1985 amount. There will also be reductions in its regular uniformed personnel, falling from 326,000 in 1985 to 240,000 in 1996. "By 1995 Britain will lose a tenth of its destroyers and frigates, all of its diesel submarines, more than a quarter of its infantry battalions, two-fifths of its armoured regiments and about

¹²⁷Jährlicher Informationsaustausch über Verteidigungsplanung, Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1996), 4.

¹²⁸This was not a change in the Basic Law, only a change in understanding it. After the 2+4 Treaty, German political leaders believed it was appropriate for the Constitutional Court to rule on a reinterpretation of the Basic Law, which it did in 1994. Today a major troop deployment abroad requires only a simple majority ruling in the Bundestag.

¹²⁹Tom Heneghan, "Full Role Seen for German Army in Foreign Missions," Reuters (27 Feb 1996), from Lexus/Nexus.

one quarter of its aircraft. As Sir Michael Quinlan might have put it, versatility will have prevailed over mass - but at the price of lower levels of readiness, sustainability and the ability to rebuild major formations."¹³⁰

Britain, of all the Western European countries, is the best equipped to provide forces in overseas engagements.¹³¹ It was the largest European contributor of manpower in the Gulf War with 35,000 troops in theater. Britain was also the first major military power in Western Europe to start restructuring their forces in order to be able to move troops rapidly on a global level. However, "almost every commentator seems to agree that the British government will not get through the decade without having to make more painful decisions about which of Britain's quiver full of Defence capabilities to keep and which to abandon."¹³²

Italy is also restructuring its military. "The current restructuring process of its armed forces is essentially driven by the dire crises of its public finances, and not so much by the requirement of scaling down force levels following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact."¹³³

¹³⁰Cowper-Coles, 151.

¹³¹Ibid., 144.

¹³²Ibid., 151.

¹³³Marco De Andreis and Gianluca Devoto, "Restructuring Italian Defense," in M. De Andreis, ed., National Defense Structures and Common Defense in Europe 1.

C. FRANCE AND GERMANY AS U.S. ALLIES

NATO is changing from an alliance for the defense of Western Europe to one of global collective defense, promoting wider interests around the world. In today's changing security situation Western European countries find themselves more reliant than ever on the U.S. to provide these military assets which would allow them to act globally. In addition, with their budget problems, Western European countries are hard put to build up these same capabilities in order to become both militarily self-sufficient, in the case of a European Defense Initiative, and ensure that the U.S. will be able to rely on them to provide what is increasingly seen as their share of the global security responsibility.

France has long seen itself as a global power. During the Cold War Europe was forced under the U.S. protective umbrella by the Soviet threat. France's desire to rejoin a NATO, reformed to give Europeans more weight in how it functions is a reaction to the changes since the demise of the Soviet Union and the renewed global influence Europe could have if it had the ability to project power outside Europe.¹³⁴ The German Army reorganization also reflects the changes since the end of the Cold War, with a growing emphasis on contributing forces for out-of-area NATO and WEU operations and supporting UN peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.¹³⁵ German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel stated: "in the long run, it is neither in the American nor the European interest that we have to call our American friends each time

¹³⁴Buchman, 2.

¹³⁵Bunten, 24.

something flares up somewhere."¹³⁶

The U.S. has worried that if there were a viable European defense entity it could draw troops away from their NATO commitment. The French view the Eurocorps and other new European multinational forces as providing the core elements for a European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI). France is increasingly calling for a European military capability that would be able to protect European interests without U.S. control. "This is despite the fact that no Western European democratic politician has the slightest chance in the foreseeable future of generating public support for the measures needed to replace the U.S. contribution to Western security."¹³⁷

In July of 1992 the Western European Union (WEU) set up a naval task force in the Adriatic Sea to enforce the embargo against Serbia. This WEU force was separate from the NATO naval task force which was executing the same mission, and was evidence of competition in the responsibility of providing security in Europe.¹³⁸ Although, While NATO took over operational control of this task force in 1993, the French idea of a military entity separate from NATO is still alive. It has only temporarily taken a back seat because of Europe's failure to handle the conflict in Bosnia and the decline in military spending and manpower in virtually all of Western Europe.

"The French drew two conclusions from the setbacks to their

¹³⁶Erlanger, A5.

¹³⁷Cowper-Coles, 145.

¹³⁸Robert Grant, "France's New Relationship with NATO," Survival 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996), 60.

European aspirations. First, the U.S. and NATO appeared increasingly necessary not only to maintain Western Europe's collective defense capabilities, but also to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War crises that France initially believed Europe could handle on its own."¹³⁹

While Western Europe's intent is to build a military capable of acting without large amounts of U.S. support, the difference between the two seems to be widening. "I see the writing on the wall that there could be an ever widening gap, which at the end could be very decisive, said General Klaus Naumann of Germany, who chairs the NATO Military Committee. This disparity can be seen in the size of the forces, the money devoted to defense research and procurement, the key capabilities of movement, intelligence and logistics, and particularly in technological acumen."¹⁴⁰

Since the end of the Cold War, both Germany and France see themselves as having a larger role in NATO military operations. They also want Europe to have a larger say in NATO affairs. By changing their force structures from large land armies focused against the Soviet Union to smaller forces able to deploy significant numbers of troops abroad, (50 - 60,000 men) France and Germany are facing up to two facts. The first is that they can no longer afford to maintain a large land force in the absence of the Soviet threat. The second is that if they want to play a integral part in global affairs in the future they must have flexible reaction and intervention forces that

¹³⁹Ibid., 63.

¹⁴⁰Atkinson and Graham.

are able to deploy and respond to trouble spots around the globe.

Another factor that will affect French and German abilities to act as U.S. allies may be their ability to operate without overseas staging bases. Overseas bases may not be as readily available as during the Cold War. Transport and logistics will become even more important with the pulling back of forces to the continental United States as well as the decreasing number of foreign countries that will allow foreign troops to be stationed on their shores. There is an increasing number of countries that see American bases on their soil as impinging on their sovereignty.¹⁴¹ France and Germany's lack of power projection capabilities leads to the conclusion that in regions with no allied military bases available, they will be reliant on U.S. assets to conduct the initial assaults.

D. WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN MILITARY OPERATIONS

With the end of the Cold War, Europe has found itself with no major threat to its security. Since the Second World War, the Soviet Union was the main force that caused the close cooperation between the United States and Western Europe for the last fifty years.

Something approaching a united 'West' has been spoken of only three times in modern history: in 1917-18, 1941-45 and the Cold War years. In the first two instances, the term was a complete misnomer, since the enemies - Germany and Austria-Hungary in the first case, Germany and Italy in the second - were full-fledged members of the West. The conflicts were more accurately described (and, indeed, they sometimes have been) as Western civil wars.

¹⁴¹David Yost, "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence," Joint Forces Quarterly no. 8 (Summer 1995), 70.

But if one stretches the point and allows all three as examples, it becomes clear that the notion of a political 'West' is one that has been attractive to Europeans only when some or all of their countries have been in great and imminent danger.¹⁴²

With no major enemy to unite against, will the cross Atlantic interaction come to an end or will the cooperation that was learned during the Cold War continue?

With the Cold War over, other factors may emerge, driving a decline in this cooperation between Western Europe and the U.S. and even between the European countries. Europe is being pushed to build a strong union to be able to compete economically and militarily on a global scale. With the changes taking place after the Soviet Union's collapse, it remains to be seen if European integration forces are stronger than individual nationalism and interests. If European countries are unable to reach the high level of integration that is envisioned, the EU may not provide the stability needed for a united European defense.

One piece of evidence that the cooperation between the U.S. and Europe is declining is that Western Europe is actively talking about having a military capability independent of the United States. While the actuality of this may be along way off - and there is opposition mostly from the UK - it is an aim that the U.S. can not discount. When fighting broke out in Yugoslavia in the summer of 1991, for example, the immediate reaction of Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission, was "We do not interfere in American affairs. We

¹⁴²Owen Harries, "The Collapse of 'the West'," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 4 (Sep/Oct 1993), 47.

hope they will have enough respect not to interfere in ours."¹⁴³

European dependence on the United States ensures that Washington has a strong voice in where and why there will be armed intervention. In some eyes the U.S. merely switched from nuclear hegemony to conventional hegemony, which unlike during the Cold War now includes France. Some French are also irritated because they perceive that the U.S. attitude is one of wanting the French military to be strong, but only for use in NATO missions, not in order to build up a separate European defense identity.¹⁴⁴

Even if the European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI) is not realized, there will be internal political pressures that may cause one or more Western European countries to opt out of certain U.S. operations. The subject of internal opposition and how it may limit the ability or willingness of France and Germany to operate abroad was discussed in the preceding chapter. As was mentioned before, a few causes may be minority activism or terrorism, such as may occur because of European-based Muslim opposition to Middle East actions or popular opposition because of there being no perceived European security interest. Other reasons may include the taking of high casualties or the high monetary cost of some missions.

E. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S./WESTERN EUROPE MILITARY BURDEN SHARING

The recent changes to the security environment, coupled with less money available because of growing social programs will mean that

¹⁴³Ibid., 49.

¹⁴⁴Atkinson and Graham.

future defense spending will continue to come under pressure to remain static or even decrease further. This will adversely affect France and Germany's ability to build up their defense infrastructure. It will also bring any attempt by the U.S. to increase France and Germany's percentage of the military burden under intense scrutiny. Increasing military spending in today's situation, would take money from other programs and may lead to strong public pressure against any move of this type. Because of the changing demographics, increase in domestic problems, and lack of an overt outside threat to their national security, many Europeans may not see a need to increase the money transferred to the U.S.

F. ABILITY TO INVEST IN JOINT INFRASTRUCTURE

While Economic and demographic trends will affect French and German abilities to provide funding for their militaries including sending forces abroad, the same can be said for the United States.¹⁴⁵ If the U.S. does not have the excess equipment capability to loan to its allies and Western Europe does not invest in equipment, what is the outlook for it integrating with U.S. forces if needed?

With 360 million people, it seems that Western Europe should have much more military power than it does when compared to the United States' 240 million. Although the U.S. has reduced its military spending since 1990, it still accounted for 36 percent of the world total of military spending in 1994. This is in contrast to the rest of the NATO countries which combined accounted for 20 percent of world

¹⁴⁵Yost, (Summer 1995), 74.

spending.¹⁴⁶

France revised its defense equipment acquisition budget in August 1995, reducing it an average of 15 percent each year between 1997 and 2002. Under the spending plan Ffr516 billion (\$101 billion) will be set aside for procurement, effectively a steady Ffr 86 billion per year.¹⁴⁷

By moving from a conscript army to a professional one, France may actually decrease the amount of money it can spend on equipment. "We estimate the operating costs of a career army could eat up 70 percent of the entire defense budget, leaving just 30 percent for equipment. This compares with the 50:50 split between operating cost and hardware at the moment."¹⁴⁸

The end of conscription in France cannot be addressed without looking at its economic impacts. Compulsory military service will not be ended until 2001 mostly because the government fears that any abrupt halt would throw too many youths on the labor market, aggravating the unemployment level, which stands at nearly three million.¹⁴⁹ There is also the effect it will have on the French defense industry. The increased operational costs of a professional

¹⁴⁶"Global Military Spending is Lowest for 20 Years," Jane's Defense Weekly 25, no. 21 (22 May 1996), 3.

¹⁴⁷J. Lewis, "French Budget Keeps Programmes Alive...," Jane's Defense Weekly 25, no. 21 (22 May 1996), 8.

¹⁴⁸Quote is from Danial Berthault, Delegation Generale l'Armement (DGA) Director for International Relations in "Debating the Merits of National Service," Jane's Defense Weekly 24, no. 16 (21 Oct 1995), 28.

¹⁴⁹Ibid.

army will decrease the amount that can be spent on equipment. The decrease in the amount spent, at mostly French firms, is estimated at approximately 20 percent of the total defense budget or eight billion dollars. This is despite the fact that French defense firms are already heavily in debt. "Their common problems are insufficient or even negative equity, heavy debts, top-heavy work forces and slim order books. However, the government, committed to spending heavily on social programs, does not have the funds to bail them out."¹⁵⁰

"The insufficiencies were generally not specific to France, but more often than not shared by her European partners: e.g. no sufficient long-range heavy transport aircraft; a very limited in-flight refueling capability (France managed to deploy 7 tanker aircraft in Saudi Arabia, whereas more than 200 were deployed by the US); a dearth of organic heavy armour and artillery in French power projection forces."¹⁵¹ The French Cold War procurement decisions are being felt today. With France forced to drastically change its military structure and with no decreases in other government expenditures seen, the French taxpayer will come under an increasingly high tax burden.¹⁵² Francois Heisbourg states that because of obsolescence of large numbers of French weapons systems and over-ambitious procurement programs that have created heavy budget obligations has resulted in France being the "only western country

¹⁵⁰J. Lewis, "State Firms Drowning in Red Ink," Jane's Defense weekly 24, no. 16 (21 Oct 1995), 29.

¹⁵¹Heisbourg, 32-33.

¹⁵²Ibid.

which had to forego any appreciable peace dividend between 1986 and 1992."¹⁵³ This statement would most likely be refuted by the other western countries who have seen high budget deficits and a lowering of money available for defense. For most countries the peace dividend meant mainly defense cuts. Defense expenditures were generally reduced because the money was not available, not because western countries chose to make do with a smaller military.

The U.S. reduced its defense expenditures for the most part because it became politically unable to continue higher spending with the end of the Cold War coupled with high national debt. Besides continuing its high social spending, Germany has to continue to fund its reintegration with former East Germany. Italy feels it did not receive a peace dividend because of its public finance problems and the need to upgrade its military forces.¹⁵⁴ Britain is also finding it necessary to reshape its forces with the consequence of not receiving a peace dividend.

"In these conditions, trade-offs will be exceptionally painful. Not only will there be little or no peace dividend, but enhanced mobility and its logistical and intelligence accompaniment will come dear. Therefore, the trade-off could come in the form of particularly deep reductions in force structure and equipment holdings."¹⁵⁵

For budgetary reasons France may continue to have the same deficiencies as was seen during the Gulf War. Current plans tend to

¹⁵³Ibid.

¹⁵⁴De Andreis and Devoto, 1.

¹⁵⁵Heisbourg, 33, 34.

support this position. "Defense Minister Charles Millon, confirmed that there would be no funding for development of the Future Large Aircraft."¹⁵⁶ Although there are plans to buy 52 Lockheed Martin C-130J's, these aircraft are more tactical/in-theater supply as opposed to a C-5 type strategic/global lift aircraft. Germany's 1996 defense budget is being cut by DM 1.25 billion (\$750 million) to DM47.1 billion, which has caused it to postpone four transport aircraft and four transport helicopters. Further cuts to DM46 billion are expected in 1997.¹⁵⁷

Another area where European countries perceive they are deficient is space-based intelligence. France has one satellite, Helios-1A, but it is an optical device and cannot see through cloud cover. The follow on Helios-2, scheduled for launch in 2002, was to be a joint venture between Germany and France. As of July 1996 Germany may pull out of the \$2.1 billion project because of their own budget cuts and instead move toward closer German-US cooperation. "German defense minister Volker Ruhe warned in an interview with the newspaper Bild Am Sonntag that he would have no money to build the satellite because of federal belt-tightening."¹⁵⁸

France is currently planning to build a new series of satellites in the early part of the next century, although it remains to be seen if they can go it alone. In the area of high-technology communication

¹⁵⁶Lewis, (22 May 1996), 8.

¹⁵⁷"Front Line Safe as Germany Cuts Defense by \$750m," Jane's Defense Weekly 25, no. 22 (29 May 1996), 3.

¹⁵⁸Barry James, "Bonn's Cuts Endanger Plan for a Spy Satellite; Key Project With France Now in Doubt," International Herald Tribune (9 July 1996), 7.

satellites, Western Europe is also dependent on U.S. support. Of the 48 satellite channels used by NATO in Bosnia, 46 belonged to the United States.¹⁵⁹

In 1990 France was spending a third of its equipment budget on its nuclear forces (*force de frappe*) but in five years that sum has dropped to a fifth, or just over Ffr20 billion. Experts believe France will shortly go further by dropping its Ffr60 billion programme to build the M5 nuclear missile for its fleet of SSBNs after the year 2010.¹⁶⁰ France is scrapping the land portion of its nuclear force by removing the 18 nuclear missiles it has stationed on the Plateau d'Albion in southern France. "Jacques Boyon, a close associate of Chirac and head of the parliamentary defense committee. Conceded that because of France's finances we can no longer afford three nuclear components."¹⁶¹

France has seemed to say that realistically it can no longer afford to be an autonomous nuclear power. This could also show the increasing perception that nuclear deterrence is not as important today as during the cold war. With decreasing budgets and increasing reliance on conventional weapons the relatively expensive nuclear forces will be the losers in the quest for funds no matter what prestige they bring.

One way for Western European countries to cut costs is for each

¹⁵⁹Atkinson and Graham.

¹⁶⁰"Country Briefing, France," Jane's Defense Weekly 24, no. 16 (21 Oct 1995), 24.

¹⁶¹J. Lewis, "Plateau d'Albion: Old Before its Time," Jane's Defense Weekly 24, no. 16 (21 Oct 1995), 26.

country to specialize in the defense industrial area in which it has de-facto leadership. Experts point out that the German Leopard 2 Main Battle Tank is the de-facto tank standard in Europe, While The UK has the edge in Military aircraft and France in Airbus, Eurocopter and Euro-Missile systems. Possible cooperation in this area is impaired by strong French insistence that they must preserve as much of their national industrial base as possible.¹⁶² There is also the problem that Germany currently has much stronger arms export laws than France and requires the approval of its Federal Security Council in order to export certain military weapons systems.¹⁶³ This has had the effect of putting a halt to any increases in this type of cooperation.

One way Western European countries may get access to military assets is the creation of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), which were agreed to in principle at the 1994 NATO Summit. This would free assets for use by European members in military operations in which the U.S. does not want to participate. This arrangement immediately brings up a problem that may become more apparent because of NATO's change to a more global outlook. There is the possibility that the U.S. will veto any use of NATO assets for a European only mission, if it is not perceived as in the U.S.'s interests. The opposite may also become true, perhaps because of the increased European control of NATO. In any operation where the U.S. is involved and is large enough where NATO forces are required to augment American forces, the assets

¹⁶²"Country Briefing, Germany," Jane's Defense Weekly (20 Mar 1996), 25.

¹⁶³This has in the past led to certain types of arms industry cooperation, the Euro-missile is one example. The arms that are to be exported are predominately built in France.

may not be made available for use by the United States. The European members of NATO may not be willing to send their assets outside of Europe if they see the mission as not in their best interests.

G. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE IMPACT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

The changing demographics in France and Germany are affecting the ability of those countries to restructure their military forces to meet the requirements of the post-Cold War environment. It will also have an effect on the willingness of France and Germany to take part in any future military operations in which the United States would like their support. While demographics are not the only variables affecting these outcomes, they must be taken into account because their impact will grow larger and more pronounced in the future. Because these problems deal with Western European domestic policy and the sovereignty of a country to set its own agenda, this is an area where the U.S. will be very limited in its power to affect the policies established by other countries.

Demography is also contributing to the economic hardships of less developed nations, in this case the North African countries, which will in turn affect Western Europe. This has lead to resentment against the comparatively richer European nations. In the future, as the gap in incomes widens further, there may be an increase in political confrontation between the "have" nations and "have nots." While Western Europe is not in danger of being militarily invaded by its regional neighbors, there is the possibility of increased confrontation in the Mediterranean region. This would likely be in the form of mass movements of war refugees and increased terrorism, by

both small independent factions and state sponsored groups. This will cause France and Germany to pay increasingly more attention to this area.

The increasing probability of growing conflict in the Mediterranean region and the possibility that it could affect Europe, has caused some Western European countries to provide more military¹⁶⁴ and economic resources to that area. Western European countries are also looking toward the future and are calling for NATO to provide increased military assets in the Southern European region in the hope that they can prevent or if not prevent at least deal with the potential conflicts.

The ability of France and Germany to provide more forces with which to contribute to international military operations in the future will increase. This is mainly a result of their force restructuring, although also partly because of France's ending of conscription and Germany's increased willingness to deploy troops outside of its own country. The plans to restructure their militaries and provide a smaller, more mobile and professional core force will give them a rapid reaction force capable of being deployed quickly to foreign conflicts. This type of force was for the most part not needed during the Cold War and the results were seen in France's inability to field an effective force in Iraq during the Desert Storm campaign.

The restructuring of their armed forces is a reaction to the nations' post-Cold War security situation, political considerations

¹⁶⁴A prime example of this is the creation in 1995 of the EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR by four of the Southern European countries, Spain, Portugal, Italy and France.

and their own budgetary constraints. After the changes have taken effect, France and Germany will have more troops available for deployment overseas than in prior years in support of NATO, UN and WEU operations even though they will have lower overall force numbers. However, there remains the question of how many of the planned 50,000- to 60,000-man force will be actual combat troops. Included in the above number will be Army, Naval and Air Force personnel with the requisite support and other non-combat troops.

What is also in doubt is Western Europe's ability to provide transportation to the area of operations and its ability to continue to support the force once it reaches the destination. Because of lack of money to rebuild their military infrastructure - transport, space-based intelligence, logistic capabilities - and the likelihood of static or falling defense spending in the future, France and Germany will be reliant on the U.S. for support in these areas for the foreseeable future.

Other considerations are the political aspects, which can not be foretold, but only planned for. In the future will France and Germany be willing to commit troops to conflicts outside of the European continent if their public perceives that there are more pressing problems closer to home; and if so will they be willing or able to pay the large amounts of money needed to use troops far from home?

IV. CONCLUSION

The United States is relying on its allies to provide troops and support for military operations not just in Western Europe, but also worldwide. This thesis has discussed factors that may lead France or Germany not to support or not to be able to provide support to the U.S. in future conflict situations.

Because France and Germany are both feeling the pressures of their domestic problems coupled with the fact that the end of the Cold War has removed the largest threat to their security, there are signs that they will not cooperate as strongly with the U.S. as they have in the past. The U.S. may have to accept the Europeans taking an increasingly Europe-first stance instead of a larger Western view. There also remains the chance that if nationalism continues to grow stronger, the European integration process will be stalled or even reversed. Europe may then return to something similar to a pre-World War One type of arrangement.

Bosnia and the Dayton peace accords have shown that there is a wide gap between European goals and capabilities. It has also shown that Europe does not have the capabilities or resources to provide for its own security and that U.S. military power is indispensable. While NATO is changing its mission to include out-of-area operations, except for the smallest missions the U.S. will have to bear the brunt of the cost and manpower. As these missions move farther away from the Western European area, the more important will be the role of the U.S.

The U.S. should not expect France and Germany to increase their defense spending any time in the near future. If their domestic costs continue to increase, as they will have to without social welfare reforms, the amount available to be spent on defense may decrease instead. Without a clear threat, there will be increased public pressure not to cut the social welfare programs that Western Europeans have gotten used to and, as seen in the past, are willing to defy their governments in order to keep.

At this time Western European countries are attempting to change their force structures in order to compete in the new post-Cold War security situation. Because of the long lead times inherent in building up military forces coupled with their defense industry problems and inefficient procurement processes, France and Germany will likely remain deficient in the military support areas for the foreseeable future. These areas include troop transport, logistics support and space-based assets (communication and intelligence). Their lack of power projection also means that in any place without pre-located military bases, the United States will have to provide the initial beach heads for any allied forces.

A. OUT-OF-AREA OPERATIONS

The Western European responses to out-of-area missions may be affected by both their domestic problems and lack of resources. The fact remains that NATO missions can be vetoed by a single negative vote of any one of its sixteen members. This may leave the U.S. to act without France and Germany in areas outside of Europe, and force

it to look more toward building regional allies. It may also force the U.S. not only to act unilaterally, but may mean that America will be increasingly alone politically if France and Germany have different objectives.

France has shown its reluctance to intervene in Middle East conflicts because of its large Muslim population. This reluctance may increase in the future as a result of a lack of assimilation of this minority and the fact that the Muslim population will grow as a percentage of the total population.

Increased domestic economic pressures can also not be discounted as a source of French and German reluctance to take part in future Middle East missions. Western Europe is more reliant on Middle East trade than the U.S. If Western Europeans perceive that they will lose more than they could gain by antagonizing Middle East governments, they may not risk losing those economic relations. This could lead Western European governments not only to decline sending troops but also not to support the U.S. politically.

As the operations move further away from Western Europe to Southern Asia and the Far East, France and Germany may not have the resources to contribute more than a nominal force. While they are building up rapid reaction forces of 50,000 to 60,000 men, the actual combat potential of these units will be much less than the totals. The ability and/or willingness for France and Germany to pay for a deployment of this type will also become more doubtful as their domestic spending increases. There is the potential that public pressure to stay out of any costly and far removed conflict will keep

any military support at the bare minimum and possibly only as a token gesture.

B. THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Western European realization that the U.S. is indispensable for its security needs leads to the conclusion that Europe has no alternative than to accept the U.S. lead in defense matters. The French goal of setting up an independent European defense entity that will be capable of providing for European security is not a reality at this time and will not be until Western Europeans can commit to spend the needed money on defense. It does not seem likely that the Western European politicians will be willing to risk massive public dissension by decreasing public social welfare with a simultaneous increase in military spending.

There is also the possibility that the new global orientation of NATO will not become a viable concept. The reality is that France and Germany can not afford to pay the costs of being part of a global force now and will be even less so in the future. The U.S. will still have to provide the lion's share of costs and manpower in any operation outside of Europe.

More important than costs is the probability that, on a global scale, European objectives may be different than those of the U.S. Differences in foreign policy may come as a result of economic matters, public pressures or internal minority activism. Because of these differences, NATO may become frozen in its ability to act, leaving the United States to make the decision as to whether it will

take action. In future conflicts outside Europe, the U.S. may have to make its decision based not on how much support Western Europe will provide, but whether it can get enough regional allies to act with it or if it has the ability to act alone.

If faced with a major non-European regional conflict, with the U.S. not able to gather enough regional allies and world support to take action and ensure victory, the U.S. may be reluctant to act unilaterally. By not getting involved in such a conflict the U.S. may be viewed as disengaging from the region or unable to intervene militarily in support of its own stated security interests. This would be a major setback in regional security and could be viewed as a victory by the aggressor in the conflict, thus leading to greater instability and consequent harm to broader U.S. interests.

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